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The Arizona Immigration Legislation, also known as the “Support Our Law Enforcement 
and Safe Neighborhoods Act”, has created much controversy since being signed into law 
in April 2010.  This legislation, called Senate Bill 1070 (and then revised by House Bill 
2162), still in the process of evolving, grants law enforcement officers the ability to 
request identification of an individual “for any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by a 
law enforcement official” (House Engrossed S.B. 1070, 2010, p. 2). The bill further 
criminalizes the act of failing to carry identification, namely “an alien registration 
document” (House Engrossed S.B. 1070, 2010, p. 4) on the person at all times, along 
with a plethora of other criminalized acts.  The analysis provided by Black’s theory on 
the behavior of law is categorized as sociological jurisprudence. How this law affects 
society, whether in the political, judicial, or media realms, is intrinsically linked to how 
Senate Bill 1070 behaves and the ramifications it will have upon the inhabitants within 
the Arizona state society as well as upon inhabitants in the United States.  This thesis 
analyzes the text of the immigration legislation, discusses the constitutional and 
immigration law issues surrounding said legislation, and applies this knowledge to 
Donald Black’s theory from The Behavior of Law (1976, 2008) in order to understand the 
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1.0 Introduction 
 The topic of illegal immigration is not new.  In fact, the topic of immigration has 
been debated by the federal government of the United States since the late 18th Century, 
beginning with the Alien Act of 1798, and has continued with its ever constant and 
evolving problem of border management.  What is changing with this topic is the issue of 
enforcement.  According to Carol Swain (2007), editor of Debating Immigration, “Much 
of the illegal immigration is from Mexico.  According to Douglas Massey, U.S. policy 
since 1986 has been a policy of contradictions…Rather than reducing illegal 
immigration, U.S. policies have made it less likely that illegal migrants from Mexico will 
return home of their own accord.” (p. 3). 
 However, the Arizona immigration legislation seeks to change the issue of illegal 
immigration and the current ways of enforcement.  The immigration legislation, Senate 
Bill 1070, specifically states that the true intent behind the construction of the bill is to 
“work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and 
economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” (Senate Engrossed 
S.B. 1070, 2010, p. 2).  (See Appendix on page 73 for actual legislation.) 
The frustration of the border states, like Arizona, is understandable since they 
contain a higher percentage of immigrants within their state borders, although the “color” 
or race of these illegal immigrants can vary.  According to the Pew Hispanic Center, “As 
of March 2010, 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States, 
virtually unchanged from a year earlier…” (Passel & Cohn, 2011, p. 1).  Additionally, 
“Unauthorized immigrants represented 28% of the nation’s foreign-born population of 
40.2 million in March 2010…” (Passel & Cohn, 2011, p. 10).  Furthermore, according to 
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the Pew Hispanic Center: 
…unauthorized immigrants made up 3.7% of the nation’s population and 
5.2% of its labor force in March 2010. Births to unauthorized immigrant 
parents accounted for 8% of newborns from March 2009 to March 2010, 
according to the center’s estimates, which are based mainly on data from 
the government’s Current Population Survey. (Passel & Cohn, 2011, p. 1). 
 
However, protected groups get swept up in the broad wording of the bill.  This 
legislation, as this study, demonstrates, goes beyond the normal policing and regulations 
to do exactly what the bill proposes: deter (and more specifically, a specific group of 
people).  While the wording of the legislation claims to only be targeting the illegal 
immigrants detected within Arizona’s state borders, this study shows that the impact of 
Senate Bill 1070 sends ripples beyond Arizona’s state lines to impact the rights of many 
minorities and immigrants (both legal and illegal) around the nation. 
Donald Black, author of The Behavior of Law, explains how law behaves with the 
many social variables in the society.  Law is not stagnant or a uniform equation that 
produces the same answer each time.  Rather, law fluctuates with each variable that is 
introduced during legal interactions.  Black (1976, 2008) states, “Behavior is the variable 
aspect of reality.  Everything behaves, living or not…” (p. 1).  Thus when changes in the 
law occur, it becomes necessary to investigate what impacts those laws will have and 
who will be most affected.  Using Black’s theory on the behavior of law, this thesis will 
answer one main question: How does law behave in relation to the Arizona immigration 
legislation? 
By examining this question, the reader will see who benefits from this law, who 
suffers the ramifications of this legislation, and how society will be altered if this law 
goes into effect. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of the Arizona Immigration Legislation 
The Arizona immigration legislation, Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070), was passed by 
the forty-ninth legislature of the Arizona State Senate in April 2010 in order to enact 
tougher legislation pertaining to illegal immigration and “relating to unlawfully present 
aliens” (Senate Engrossed S.B. 1070, 2010, p. i) within the state.  Technically called 
“Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” the law was later revised 
and edited with addendums to address the issues of racial profiling by law enforcement.  
The subsequent addition was named House Bill 2162 (H.B. 2162), “relating to 
immigration and border security [and] providing for conditional enactment” (House Bill 
2162, 2010, p. 1).  Together, these bills give state officials the ability “for any lawful 
stop, detention, or arrest” (House Bill 2162, 2010, p. 3) and “where reasonable suspicion 
exists that the person is an alien AND is unlawfully present in the United States, a 
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status 
of the person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation” (House 
Bill 2162, 2010, p. 4).  The Arizona Legislature later released a House Engrossed version 
of the legislation combining the two bills and re-editing Senate Bill 1070 within the 
parameters of House Bill 2162. 
The Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training board published their “Peace 
Officer Training Presentation for the S.B. 1070 Legislation” (P.O.S.T.), including both a 
video and handouts pertaining to instructing officers on incorporating the new legislation 
into their daily patrol.  According to the handout, “Implementation of the 2010 Arizona 
Immigration Laws, Statutory Provisions for Peace Officers,” the factors that can be 
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considered in order to develop reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence include: 
Lack of identification (if otherwise required by law)  
Possession of foreign identification  
Flight and/or preparation for flight  
Engaging in evasive maneuvers, in vehicle, on foot, etc.  
Voluntary statements by the person regarding his or her citizenship  
or unlawful presence… 
Foreign vehicle registration  
Counter-surveillance or lookout activity  
In company of other unlawfully present aliens  
Location, including for example:  
A place where unlawfully present aliens are known to 
congregate looking for work  
A location known for human smuggling or known 
smuggling routes  
Traveling in tandem  
Vehicle is overcrowded or rides heavily  
Passengers in vehicle attempt to hide or avoid detection  
Prior information about the person  
Inability to provide his or her residential address  
Claim of not knowing others in same vehicle or at same location  
Providing inconsistent or illogical information  
Dress  
Demeanor – for example, unusual or unexplained nervousness, erratic 
behavior, refusal to make eye contact  
Significant difficulty communicating in English (Arizona P.O.S.T., 2010, 
p. 3-4). 
 
 These factors, when considered together, allow the officer to claim reasonable 
suspicion surrounding the individual’s residency status.  These elements are not classified 
as racial profiling according to the United States Supreme Court. States P.O.S.T. (2010): 
In the context of applying these new laws, reasonable suspicion exists 
when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when 
considered with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for 
particularized suspicion that the person is an unlawfully present alien. The 
requirement of particularized suspicion encompasses two elements. First, 
the assessment must be based upon the totality of the circumstances. 
Second, that assessment must arouse a reasonable suspicion that the 
particular person is unlawfully present in the United States. (p. 4). 
 
 The Supreme Court has ruled that in some cases, it is allowable for a legal stop, 
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search, and/or seizure.  Thomas Clancy (2008), author of The Fourth Amendment: Its 
History and Interpretation, states: 
Targeting innocent persons, who are not otherwise suspected of 
committing a crime, solely on the basis of their race is intolerable and 
impermissible.  Some allegations of the unacceptable use of race are 
simply ignored-at least by the Supreme Court-where there is an objective 
basis for the search or seizure.  Thus, according to the Court, a traffic stop 
is justified when a traffic violation has occurred, even though the officer is 
motivated in part to investigate another crime for which justification is 
lacking.  There are other situations where there is a fundamental lack of 
consensus, such as whether race or ethnicity can be permissibly used as a 
factor-perhaps one of many-to justify a search or seizure of a person.  
However, the Supreme Court has permitted apparent ancestry to be a 
factor in immigration enforcement stops. (p. 539-540). 
 
 According to Lentz and Chaires, authors of “Full Speed Ahead: Illinois v. Lidster 
and Suspicionless Vehicle Stops”, the issue of pretextual stops was legitimized by the 
Supreme Court after the Whren decision.  Thus making it possible for law enforcement to 
use race and other characteristics in order to initiate a legal stop.  States Lentz and 
Chaires (2007): 
Clearly, if such articulable suspicion exists, there is no need for a 
pretextual traffic stop.  It is important to note that under modern traffic and 
vehicle codes it is very difficult for anyone to drive more than a short 
distance without violating some provision.  In Whren v. U.S. the Supreme 
Court essentially ruled that where probable cause to stop for a traffic 
violation is present, an officer’s subjective intent is not a Fourth 
Amendment issue.  The legitimate uses of these pretextual stops remain 
uncertain. (p. 178).  
 
Thus the Arizona P.O.S.T.’s presentation for training officers on what constitutes 
reasonable suspicion does not equate to racial profiling because of the Court’s 
interpretation of the law.  While the profiling of such individuals is based on race rather 
than the actual infringement, the Court has deemed such a practice as legitimate within 
the legal system.  Such a legal perspective can have substantial impacts when discussing 
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the Arizona immigration legislation.  However, as seen from the Court, the P.O.S.T.’s list 
of unlawful presence characteristics does not constitute racial profiling, despite its 
inherent profiling nature. 
Senator Russell Pearce, the author of S.B. 1070, claims to have written the bill in 
order to deal with the state’s growing problem of illegal immigration.   Pearce states, 
“Illegal is not a race, it is a crime. S.B. 1070 simply codifies federal law into state law 
and removes excuses and concerns about states’ inherent authority to enforce these laws 
and removes all so called ‘sanctuary’ policies.” (“Enough is Enough”, 2010, p. 1).  
However, Pearce also states in his personal website profile that: 
Two of my sons are in law enforcement, Colten with Gilbert P.D. and 
Sean with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. On Dec. 16, 2004 Sean 
was shot in the line of duty by an illegal alien while serving a homicide 
warrant on an illegal alien. I was in Washington D.C. at the time testifying 
about our nations failed immigration policies when I was handed a note 
and told there was an emergency at home and to call immediately. I called 
home and was told Sean was critically wounded after being shot in the 
chest and stomach and was being transported to Maricopa County Medical 
Center. (“Bio”, 2010, p.1). 
 
Similar information about his son’s injury can also be found on his Arizona State 
Legislature senator biography page.  Such information raises the question of the true 
intent behind Pearce’s legislation.  As the New York Times states in the “Times Topics” 
section: 
“Mr. Pearce's son, a Maricopa County sheriff's deputy, was shot and 
wounded in 2004 by an illegal immigrant, and Mr. Pearce, a former 
sheriff's deputy, was shot and wounded while arresting gang members 20 
years ago, he has said. Some have speculated that the events have inspired 
Mr. Pearce's anti-immigration legislation.” (“Times Topics: Russell 
Pearce”, 2010, p. 1-2). 
 
The legislation’s initial paragraph clearly paints the true intent behind the 
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construction of the original and later revised legislation.  The bill’s intent stems from the 
state’s frustration over the growing problems such as: illegal immigration, drug 
trafficking, and human trafficking across the southern border of the United States.  States 
the original S.B. 1070: 
The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition 
through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government 
agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work 
together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens 
and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States. 
(Senate Engrossed S.B. 1070, 2010, p.1). 
 
The legislation was later amended to begin with, “The legislature finds that there 
is a compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws 
throughout all of Arizona.” (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, p.1).  The original 
bill attempted to counter possible rights violations (other than the provisions set forth by 
House Bill 2162), by stating that it intended to protect civil rights.  The main critique of 
S.B. 1070 and H.B. 2162 arises from the claim that the legislation makes it permissible 
for law enforcement officials to encroach upon the rights of U.S. citizens.  The New York 
Times states that S.B. 1070, 
…coincided with economic anxiety and followed a number of high-profile 
crimes attributed to illegal immigrants and smuggling, though federal data 
suggest that crime is falling in Arizona, as it is nationally, despite a surge 
of immigration. The law's supporters said it reflected frustration over 
inaction by the federal government, while critics said it would lead to 
harassment of Hispanics and turn the presumption of innocence upside 
down. (“Time Topics: S.B. 1070”, 2011, p. 1). 
 
S.B. 1070 attempts to counter this critique by stating, “This act shall be 
implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting 
the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United 
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States citizens.” (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, p.19).  As seen with the 
P.O.S.T. instructions for identifying illegal immigrants, it may prove difficult for 
Arizonan officials to respect the privileges and civil rights of individuals while still using 
racial factors to constitute reasonable suspicion. 
The act also stipulates that each section of the bill must be considered separate 
and apart from the entirety.  This stipulation, which will be later addressed, requires each 
level of the judicial system to examine the case thoroughly and subject the bill to a 
section-by-section analysis to consider an injunction and/or the constitutionality of the 
bill.  States S.B. 1070, “If a provision of this act or its application to any person or 
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or 
applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or 
application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.” (House Engrossed 
Senate Bill 1070, 2010, p.19).  With this provision in mind, it is necessary to examine the 
separate section of the bill in accordance with the legal analysis of the Federal District 
Court of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court.  Through analysis of this 
legislation, the understanding of the impacts of these bills, if found constitutional and 
enforceable in the state of Arizona, will be profound. 
2.2 Court Analysis of the Arizona immigration legislation 
Just before Arizona’s immigration legislation was due to go into effect, the 
Federal District Court of Arizona issued its opinion on the new laws and placed an 
injunction of sections of the legislation.  Due to the fact that the Arizona Legislation 
stipulates that each section of the bill must be considered separate and apart from the 
entirety, the Court examined each section and specified which sections would be subject 
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to the injunction.   The Court states that it “is obligated to consider S.B. 1070 on a section 
by section and provision by provision basis.” (United States v. Arizona, 2010, p. 2).  On 
July 28, 2010 Justice Susan Bolton of the Federal District Court of Arizona ordered the 
preliminary enjoining of Section 2 (B), Section 3, a portion of Section 5, and Section 6.  
These sections of S.B. 1070 and H.B. 2162 were halted and prevented Governor Brewer 
from enforcement in the state of Arizona until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals could 
render a decision.  Justice Bolton did not enjoin Section 1, Section 2(A) and (C)-(L), 
Section 4, a portion of Section 5, and Sections 7-13.  The portions that were enjoined and 
had an injunction issued against it pertain to: 
 
Portion of Section 2 of S.B. 1070 
A.R.S. § 11-1051(B): requiring that an officer make a reasonable attempt 
to determine the immigration status of a person 
stopped, detained or arrested if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in 
the United States, and requiring verification of the 
immigration status of any person arrested prior to 
releasing that person 
Section 3 of S.B. 1070 
A.R.S. § 13-1509:  creating a crime for the failure to apply for or carry 
alien registration papers 
Portion of Section 5 of S.B. 1070 
A.R.S. § 13-2928(C):  creating a crime for an unauthorized alien to solicit, 
apply for, or perform work 
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 
A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(5):  authorizing the warrantless arrest of a person where 
there is probable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense that makes the person 
removable from the United States. 
 
(United States v. Arizona, 2010, p. 4). 
 
 
 Justice Bolton agreed with the United States that the federal government would 
likely succeed in showing that federal law preempted these sections and that these 
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sections would cause “irreparable harm” to both the federal government and the public 
interest if an injunction were not issued. 
 For section 2(B) the Court determined that bestowing law enforcement officials 
with the ability to attempt to determine the immigration status of the individual who was 
stopped would result in unnecessary harassment as well as a violation of civil rights for 
U.S. citizens.  The State of Arizona countered by stating that it did not expect officers to 
check for every person’s legal status of those who were stopped, but rather only those 
where suspicion arose.  The Court rebuffed the argument by stating: 
Arizona goes on to state, “[T]he Arizona Legislature could not have 
intended to compel Arizona’s law enforcement officers to determine and 
verify the immigration status of every single person arrested – even for 
United States citizens and when there is absolutely no reason to believe 
the person is unlawfully present in the country.” (Id.) The Court cannot 
interpret this provision as Arizona suggests. (United States v. Arizona, 
2010, p. 14).   
 
The Court reasoned that despite the many forms of identification that an 
individual may provide to law enforcement, these forms of identification do not 
necessarily prove the legal status of an individual.   
Furthermore, such a check would place burden upon a legal immigrant who 
would violate the protections set forth by Congressional legislation ensuring uniform 
treatment of all immigrants, and for that matter any stopped individual, in the United 
States.  The Court then argued that the large number of people who are jailed or arrested, 
but never booked into jail, would cause an extended stay for individuals not charged with 
a crime, but merely being held until their legal status could be determined.  Such 
detention time, especially extended detention time, for people not yet charged or guilty of 
any crime is not permissible.  The legislation would open the door for individuals to be 
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considered guilty until proven innocent. 
Finally, the Court supplemented this reasoning with the fact that in 2009, Tucson 
did a “cite and release” procedure that allowed them to stop an individual, “arrest” them, 
and then immediately release them.  The Court states, “Under Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, 
all arrestees will be required to prove their immigration status to the satisfaction of state 
authorities, thus increasing the intrusion of police presence into the lives of legally-
present aliens (and even United States citizens), who will necessarily be swept up by this 
requirement.” (United States v. Arizona, 2010, p. 16).  The United States also argued that 
many groups of immigrants could be technically legal, but lacking the proper paperwork, 
and could be negatively harmed by such legislation.  According to the Court, groups 
(such as the visitors from the Visa Waiver Program), individuals who have applied to 
receive asylum, those with temporary protected status or U and T visa applications, and 
those falling under the jurisdiction of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) might 
be unable to demonstrate documentation to state officials.  Furthermore, citizens of the 
United States are not required to carry identification, and might themselves have an issue 
of proving valid citizenship to officials.  The Court further states: 
First, the United States suggests that the impact on lawfully-present aliens 
is enhanced because this requirement applies to stops for even very minor, 
non-criminal violations of state law, including jaywalking, failing to have 
a dog on a leash, or riding a bicycle on the sidewalk. (Id. at 28.) Also, the 
United States argues that the impact will be increased because other 
provisions in S.B. 1070 put pressure on law enforcement agencies and 
officials to enforce the immigration laws vigorously. (United States v. 
Arizona, 2010, p. 19). 
 
As later discussed in this study, the increased pressure to enforce S.B. 1070 
vigorously coupled with the P.O.S.T. list of identifying characteristics for reasonable 
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suspicion would leave some groups and/or individuals more vulnerable to the law than 
others.  Thus for every minor violation, some individuals could be at a higher risk of 
sustaining a legal contact. 
Section 3 of S.B. 1070, the United States argued, would result in the harassment 
of aliens.  In fact, such wording would open the door to pretextual stops, where an 
official could wait for an ethnic minority to commit a minor infraction in order to initiate 
a legal contact.  The Court reasoned that “…Section 3 alters the penalties established by 
Congress under the federal registration scheme. Section 3 stands as an obstacle to the 
uniform, federal registration scheme and is therefore an impermissible attempt by 
Arizona to regulate alien registration.” (United States v. Arizona, 2010, p. 22-3). 
Section 5 of S.B. 1070 was found to conflict with the federal setup for punishing 
employers of illegal aliens and employees who attempted to submit false documents in 
order to gain employment. 
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 was found to specifically target aliens (whether legal or 
illegal) for crimes that are considered “removable.”  The state of Arizona defines those 
public offenses as: 
…conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or of a fine is 
provided by any law of the state in which it occurred or by any law, 
regulation or ordinance of a political subdivision of that state and, if the 
act occurred in a state other than this state, it would be so punishable 
under the laws, regulations or ordinances of this state or of a political 
subdivision of this state if the act had occurred in this state. (United States 
v. Arizona, 2010, p. 30). 
 
However, the Court objected to this section of S.B. 1070 since the definition of 
removable public offenses allows for the “probable cause to believe the person committed 
a crime in another state that would be considered a crime if it had been committed in 
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Arizona and that would subject the person to removal from the United States.” (United 
States v. Arizona, 2010, p. 31).  The Court further reasoned that such wording in the 
legislation would allow for the targeting of immigrants (whether legal or not) since only 
immigrants could face the possibility of being removed from the country.  Such targeting 
of a group was not allowed by the District Court of Arizona.  Furthermore, certain crimes 
committed in another state may not equate to the same severity in the state of Arizona.  
For a law enforcement official to check for a crime, compare the crime, attempt to equate 
that crime to an equal crime in Arizona, and find a relationship between the other state 
and Arizona’s statutes would leave open an area of law with too much room for error.  
Such a task is usually reserved for the federal government for this reason. 
 The Court allowed for some of S.B. 1070 to stand while blocking the most 
threatening pieces of the legislation.  As Judge Bolton states, “The Court therefore finds 
that preserving the status quo through a preliminary injunction is less harmful than 
allowing state laws that are likely preempted by federal law to be enforced.” (United 
States v. Arizona, 2010, p. 35).  The case was then appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  
 In April 2011, the three-judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled to uphold the injunction that Judge Susan Bolton of the Federal 
District Court of Arizona had implemented.  According to Marc Lacey of the New York 
Times, “The decision calling the provisions unconstitutional was a victory for the Obama 
administration, which argued that the law interfered with the federal government’s 
authority over immigration. Two judges ruled against Arizona, and one dissented in part 
from them.” (“Appeals Court Rules”, 2011, p. 1).  The 2-1 vote confirmed Judge 
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Bolton’s previous injunction and currently continues to prohibit the same sections of the 
Arizona Immigration Legislation.  States the Court: 
The district court granted the United States’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction in part, enjoining enforcement of S.B. 1070 Sections 2(B), 3, 
5(C), and 6, on the basis that federal law likely preempts these provisions. 
Id. at 1008. Arizona appealed the grant of injunctive relief, arguing that 
these four sections are not likely preempted; the United States did not 
cross-appeal the partial denial of injunctive relief. Thus, the 
United States’ likelihood of success on its federal preemption argument 
against these four sections is the central issue this appeal presents.  
 
We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
enjoining S.B. 1070 Sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6. Therefore, we affirm 
the district court’s preliminary injunction order enjoining these certain 
provisions of S.B. 1070. (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 4). 
 
 The Court essentially confirmed that the United States government was able to 
preempt the state in the 4 sections in contention and that the injunction against Arizona 
would still stand.  The Court asserts that: 
We stress that the question before us is not, as Arizona has portrayed, 
whether state and local law enforcement officials can apply the statute in a 
constitutional way. Arizona’s framing of the Salerno issue assumes that 
S.B. 1070 is not preempted on its face, and then points out allegedly 
permissible applications of it. This formulation misses the point: there can 
be no constitutional application of a statute that, on its face, conflicts with 
Congressional intent and therefore is preempted by the Supremacy Clause. 
(United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 7). 
 
 The Court first analyzed Section 2(B) and confirmed that the phrasing, which 
allowed for an officer to check the immigration status of an individual, was actually quite 
specific and not as optional as Arizona tried to argue.  Arizona again argued that the 
officers did not need to check every individual’s status.  However, the Court countered 
saying: 
On its face, the text does not support Arizona’s reading of Section 2(B). 
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The second sentence is unambiguous: “Any person who is arrested shall 
have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is 
released.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010) (emphasis added). 
The all encompassing “any person,” the mandatory “shall,” and the 
definite “determined,” make this provision incompatible with the first 
sentence’s qualified “reasonable attempt . . . when practicable,” and 
qualified “reasonable suspicion.” (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 9). 
 
 The Court determined that Congress, through federal immigration law, already 
had provisions that the federal government implemented for immigration issues.  It also 
concluded that Arizona had overstepped its bounds by trying to enforce its legislation 
over the federal law.  States the Court: 
Section 2(B) sidesteps Congress’ scheme for permitting the states to assist 
the federal government with immigration enforcement. Through Section 
2(B), Arizona has enacted a mandatory and systematic scheme that 
conflicts with Congress’ explicit requirement that in the ‘[p]erformance of 
immigration officer functions by State officers and employees,’ such 
officers ‘shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney 
General.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Section 2(B) therefore interferes with 
Congress’ scheme because Arizona has assumed a role in directing its 
officers how to enforce the INA. We are not aware of any INA provision 
demonstrating that Congress intended to permit states to usurp the 
Attorney General’s role in directing state enforcement of federal 
immigration laws. (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 15). 
 
 Thus, the Court ruled that Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 was pre-empted by the 
federal government.  The Court stated, “Through Section 2(B), Arizona has attempted to 
hijack a discretionary role that Congress delegated to the Executive.” (United States v. 
Arizona, 2011, p. 15).  Since Arizona had created mandatory immigration status checks 
for local police, which interferes with federal enforcement agencies and their policies, it 
was ruled that the federal government and its policies would supersede S.B. 1070.  The 
Court found that this section of S.B. 1070 was inconsistent with other government 
policies, infringed upon the Attorney General’s powers and enforcement abilities, and 
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that such a law would have a negative impact on the United States’ relationship with 
other countries. 
 Citing previous caselaw, the Court stated that when state legislation created 
negative relations between the federal government and other foreign bodies, then the 
federal government has the right to preempt said legislation.  The Court notes: 
The record before this court demonstrates that S.B. 1070 does not threaten 
a “likelihood . . . [of] produc[ing] something more than incidental effect;” 
rather, Arizona’s law has created actual foreign policy problems of a 
magnitude far greater than incidental. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 
(emphasis added by Court). Thus far, the following foreign leaders and 
bodies have publicly criticized Arizona’s law: The Presidents of Mexico, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the governments of Brazil, 
Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the national assemblies in Ecuador 
and Nicaragua and the Central American Parliament; six human rights 
experts at the United Nations; the Secretary General and many permanent 
representatives of the Organization of American States; the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights; and the Union of South 
American Nations. (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 19). 
 
 Due to the overlap of federal law and state law, the infringement upon the federal 
government’s duties and powers, the prospect of allowing all fifty states to overlap 
federal immigration law, and the souring foreign relationship due to this legislation, the 
Court opted to preempt Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070.  
 The Court also upheld the injunction against Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which 
punished an individual for failure to carry registration documents.  The Court argued that 
the state could not punish an individual for violating a federal law.  Only the federal 
government could enforce such regulation and allocate punishment since it was an area of 
law that states did not traditionally control or enforce.  The Court responds, 
In addition, S.B. 1070 Section 3 plainly stands in opposition to the 
Supreme Court’s direction: ‘where the federal government, in the exercise 
of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of 
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regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of 
aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict 
or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce 
additional or auxiliary regulations.’ Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67. (United 
States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 24). 
 
 The Court again ruled to uphold the injunction placed against Section 3 of S.B. 
1070.  Due to the previous caselaw that stipulated the federal government’s supremacy in 
national policy over the state’s legislation, the impact of fifty states creating similar 
legislation, the consequences of such an action, and, finally, its negative effect in foreign 
relations, the district court’s injunction was upheld. 
 In Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, which stipulates that an unlawfully present 
individual cannot solicit for work or contract for work in the state of Arizona, the Court 
upheld the district court’s injunction again.  The Court stated that historically, the federal 
government held that the illegal immigrant should be deterred from employment via job 
availability and penalties for the employer, but not to sanction the illegal immigrant and 
punish the individual. States the Court: 
In National Center, we considered whether the INA, through 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a), authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to 
promulgate regulations which ‘imposed a condition against employment in 
appearance and delivery bonds of aliens awaiting deportation hearings.’ 
Id. at 1351. To decide this question, we carefully reviewed the history of 
employment-related provisions in the INA’s legislative scheme—
including the legislative history of the IRCA amendments. Id. at 1364-70. 
We concluded that ‘[w]hile Congress initially discussed the merits of 
fining, detaining or adopting criminal sanctions against the employee, it 
ultimately rejected all such proposals…Congress quite clearly was willing 
to deter illegal immigration by making jobs less available to illegal aliens 
but not by incarcerating or fining aliens who succeeded in obtaining 
work.’ Id. at 1367-68. (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 27). 
 
 By citing a plethora of federal statutes and codes, the Court argued that Congress 
had set up a very specific and particular scheme for immigration and for the enforcement 
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of illegal immigrants’ employment.  Because Congress opted not to punish illegal 
immigrants that solicited for work or even became employed, the Court argued that it did 
not mean that Arizona could then enforce punitive legislation. Rather, according to the 
Court, Congress’ specific scheme does not allow for such legislation by the state and 
therefore preempts state action.  The Court asserts: 
In the context of unauthorized immigrant employment, Congress has 
deliberately crafted a very particular calibration of force which does not 
include the criminalization of work. By criminalizing work, S.B. 1070 
Section 5(C) constitutes a substantial departure from the approach 
Congress has chosen to battle this particular problem. Therefore, 
Arizona’s assertion that this provision ‘furthers the strong federal policy’ 
does not advance its argument against preemption. Sharing a goal with the 
United States does not permit Arizona to ‘pull[ ] levers of influence that 
the federal Act does not reach.’ Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376. By pulling the 
lever of criminalizing work—which Congress specifically chose not to 
pull in the INA—Section 5(C) ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’ Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. It is therefore likely that federal law 
preempts Section 5(C). (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 32). 
 
 Again, the Court reasoned that previous caselaw, Congress’ intent to regulate 
illegal immigrants’ employment a specific way, and the negative reactions from foreign 
governments allowed the federal government to preempt the state of Arizona. 
 Finally, in Section 6, which stipulates that an officer may arrest an individual if 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a removable 
offense, the Court again upheld the district court’s injunction.  The Court argued that the 
out-of-state issue that was presented by the district court allowed for warrantless arrests, 
and would subject a person to removal for crimes that were either committed in Arizona 
or outside of Arizona’s jurisdiction.  The Court concluded that Congress had never 
intended to allow greater authority to local law enforcement than federal officials; and 
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therefore the federal government would preempt the state.  The Court states: 
Thus, Section 6 significantly expands the circumstances in which 
Congress has allowed state and local officers to arrest immigrants. Federal 
law does not allow these officers to conduct warrantless arrests based on 
probable cause of civil removability, but Section 6 does. Therefore, 
Section 6 interferes with the carefully calibrated scheme of immigration 
enforcement that Congress has adopted, and it appears to be preempted. 
Arizona suggests, however, that it has the inherent authority to enforce 
federal civil removability without federal authorization, and therefore that 
the United States will not ultimately prevail on the merits. We do not 
agree. Contrary to the State’s view, we simply are not persuaded that 
Arizona has the authority to unilaterally transform state and local law 
enforcement officers into a state-controlled DHS force to carry out its 
declared policy of attrition. (United States v. Arizona, 2011, p. 35). 
 
 Thus, the Court reasoned that Section 6 exceeded the powers that Congress 
granted to state and local officials and overlapped with the powers that the federal 
government granted to its own officials. Because the Court did not agree with Arizona’s 
argument that it could enforce the civil provisions of federal immigration law, the Court 
upheld the district court’s injunction.  The Court also held that such legislation made by 
all fifty states would be detrimental and that foreign relationships with the United States 
would also suffer a negative effect.  Therefore, the federal government preempts the state 
again. 
 In totality, the three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed all four 
injunctions that had been placed upon the legislation by the district court.  Arizona 
governor Jan Brewer and Attorney General Tom Horne issued a joint statement that 
confirmed that the state would continue to fight the issue in the court system.  The press 
release reads: 
In the days ahead, Governor Brewer, Attorney General Horne and their 
legal team – in conjunction with counsel for the Arizona Legislature – will 
be considering their legal options. Those options include appealing to a 
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larger, en banc panel of the 9th Circuit Court, or seeking an immediate 
petition for the U.S. Supreme Court to lift the injunction on S.B. 1070. It 
has always been expected that this legal fight would be a long one. But the 
Ninth Circuit Court is the most overturned appeals court in the nation for a 
reason. Both Governor Brewer and Attorney General Horne believe that 
the constitutionality of S.B. 1070 will eventually be affirmed. (“Joint 
Statement”, 2011, p. 1). 
 
As a note of clarification, this study is not a pro/con paper that will decide or take 
side on whether or not the law is right or wrong.  This study is an analysis of the topic at 
hand.  Furthermore, whether or not the law is constitutional does not relate to whether the 
law is right or wrong.  The same can be said for the behavior of the law.  Just as Black’s 
theory does not take into account the motivation of the individual, this study will not take 
into account the motivation of the government to pass or fail stricter immigration laws in 
the United States.  This study is merely an objective analysis.  The main purpose of this 
analysis is to examine the factors that are associated with the legislation and to ascertain 
the true intent and purpose behind the law.   
 While the outcome of the issue is uncertain, it is clear that this case is far from 
over.  As this study demonstrates, there are many sides to the issue of immigration, and 
multiple parties are each fighting for different outcomes.  This study shows that on one 
side, the state and the prison corporations have specific interests in enforcing this 
legislation.  On the other side, other groups and the individuals themselves will want the 
federal government to preempt and protect the rights of those legally protected 
individuals who could be swept up by the state’s legislation.  However, only time will tell 





3.0 Blackian Analysis 
3.1 Introduction to Black's theories 
Donald Black, author of The Behavior Of Law, purports that the face of 
jurisprudence is evolving.  The former model of law, aptly named the “jurisprudential 
model” (Black, 1989, p. 19), looked at law through the lens of an equation: variables 
would be plugged in and the result would be automatic and unprejudiced.  This concept 
creates an equation in which “law is fundamentally an affair of rules” (Black, 1989, p. 
19).  However, as Black notes in his book Sociological Justice, this equation is not how 
law has actually functioned in the past.  While it would be convenient to believe that 
justice is blind and that past legal interactions were done in a manner that was fair and 
impartial, according to Black the opposite has actually happened.  Through Black’s 
theory on the behavior of law, one must view law via a sociological perspective.   Thus, 
Black’s theory looks at the underlying factors and characteristics of all the players in the 
field in order to determine what the outcome may be, or to reverse what could become a 
potentially predicable outcome and achieve a different result.  Factors like race, class, 
education level, societal status, and aristocracy can be taken into account (whether 
consciously or subconsciously) and these elements can affect the outcome of law and 
legal interactions.  By understanding these factors, one can understand how future laws 
and legislation will impact society, which groups will benefit, and which groups will 
suffer from the ramifications of such legislation. 
Black’s theory on the behavior of law is best described by a new model of law 
called “sociological jurisprudence” or the “sociological model of law.”  The predecessor 









cases should be decided,” and “used to reach decisions” (Black, 1989, p. 21).  
Conversely, the sociological model is “scientific, concerned with how cases are actually 
decided” and “used to reach explanations” (Black, 1989, p. 21).  Black (1989) writes, 
“Ideally, the rules alone determine how a case is decided, and those rules generally do not 
mention the social characteristics of the parties.”  (p. 21).  Essentially, the jurisprudential 
model is the basic equation for determining the outcome of the case, and the sociological 
model explains why that outcome occurred.  Black (1989) asserts that, 
The sociological model, however, assumes that the handling of a case 
always reflects the social characteristics of those involved in it.  This 
applies whenever and wherever law is found.  It is not merely a matter of 
differentials according to the race of the parties, their social class, gender, 
or other characteristics that nowadays attract particular attention.  Many 
other kinds of discrimination exist as well, such as differentials according 
to the degree of intimacy between the parties, the cultural distance 
between them, and their degree of organization, interdependence, 
integration, and respectability. (p. 21). 
 
 Black’s theory on the behavior of law attempts to do is explain how such factors 
affect the results of a legal interaction past the “technical core” (Black, 1989, p. 20).  That 
core, the “rules in the face of evidence” (Black, 1989, p. 20) is what yields the result in 
the mathematical equation of the jurisprudential model.  The societal model takes the 
technical core into account but also analyzes the contributing outside factors to determine 
if the law is as impartial as an equation or if there really are outside factors that contribute 
to the legislation, enforcement, and/or punishment level(s).  According to Black (1989), 


















(Black, 1989, p. 21) 
Figure 1: The Two 
Models of Law. 
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Black argues that the roots of sociological jurisprudence stem from earlier theory 
of law such as legal realism.  Black (1989) affirms that, “The central claim of legal 
realism was that the doctrines of law-the rules and principles-do not by themselves 
adequately predict and explain how cases are decided.” (p. 5).  However, Black is quick 
to admit that the theory of legal realism has also been critiqued due to the judges’ and 
juries’ utilization of feelings and personal beliefs in deciding legal outcomes with only 
application of the written law as an afterthought or legal justification.  Black (1989) 
reasons, “Thus, a famous adage of legal realism was that judicial decisions often have 
less to do with legal precedent than with what the judge had for breakfast.” (p. 5).  Yet, 
Black’s theory on the behavior of law centers on the dynamics of the particular case, 
analyzes how the outcome will be derived, and studies why such an outcome is possible.  
M.P. Baumgartner (1999) writes, 
…Black lays out a paradigm and a body of theory that builds on and 
orders the immense body of empirical information assembled about law.  
He describes the principal dimensions of legal variations, identifies the 
major independent variables that explain it, and presents a series of 
theoretical propositions stating the precise relationship between law and 
its social environment.  As Black himself has characterized this approach 
in later work, it is designed to generate formulations that are testable, 
general, simple, supported by the facts, and original (Black, 1995). (p. 5). 
 
 According to Black, law is the government’s form of social control (Black, 1976, 
2008, p. 2).  This social control, albeit only one of the many types of social control that a 
society can have, is the glue that holds the society together and away from anarchy.  As 
the processes in law increase (whether from legislation, investigation, litigation, 
mediation, and/or adjudication), the quantity of law also increases.  Law, according to 
Black, is a quantitative variable (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 3). According to Black (1976, 
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2008), “Any initiation, invocation, or application of law increases it quantity…” (p. 3).  
The concept behind this governmental social control is that as the steps involved in the 
process of the law increases (such as moving from arrest to trial), the law and social 
control will naturally increase.  As the law quantity changes, it also begins to vary by the 
society itself (the groups, the power structure, and the culture).  When such variations 
occur, different styles of social control can emerge.  In Black’s theory the four styles of 
social control pertain to: penal, compensatory, therapeutic, and conciliatory.  In light of 
the diverse types of social control and groups found within the society, the application of 
law will vary.  Some instances may require the conciliatory social control (such as civil 
mediation) whereas other times the penal social control may be necessary (such as in a 
criminal case).  Black illustrates the four styles of social control as such: 








However, according to Black (1976, 2008), “in most cases it is possible to 
identify the dominant style.” (p. 5).  When that dominant style of social control, the 
participants, and the level of law are all identified, the behavior of the legal interaction 
can easily be predicted.  Nevertheless, the theory cannot take into account an individual’s 
(Black, 1976, 2008, p. 5) 
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desires, goals, or reasons for a certain behavior- the theory merely attempts to predict and 
explain why certain legal interactions behave in a certain way.  Black (1976, 2008) 
maintains that, “Theory of this kind predicts and explains social life without regard to the 
individual as such…It has no concept of human nature.  It has nothing to do with how an 
individual experiences reality.” (p. 7).  Thus, Black’s theory takes into consideration the 
variables of a legal interaction, but not other aspects that might motivate an individual’s 
emotional responses or inclinations. 
Analysis of the social stratification of interacting individuals, the cultural divide 
between two members, and the alliances between groups are all contributing factors in 
determining the reason for an outcome while applying Black’s theory.  The analysis 
depends on five variables: stratification, morphology, culture, organization, and social 
control.  When these five variables come into play in a legal interaction, it makes it more 
likely that a certain result will occur (for instance, a corporation pursuing civil damages 
versus an individual) or that certain punishments might be allotted to a specific type of 
individual (for example a repeat offender versus a juvenile).  Black (1989) writes, “The 
social characteristics of these people constitute the social structure of the case…The 
status of each supporter similarly contributes to the social structure of the case, as does 
the social distance between each supporter and everyone else.” (p. 8).   
Once the social structure of the case becomes apparent, the legal outcomes are 
easier to predict.  By understanding how stratification, morphology, culture, organization, 
and social control all interact within the parameters of a legal environment, one can 
possibly control and/or predict the potential outcome in the legal equation found within 
the jurisprudential model.  Black (1989) explains that, “…structure is crucial to 
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understanding legal variation from one technically identical case to another.  We have 
discovered that the social structure of a case predicts and explains how it is handled.” (p. 
8).  By analyzing these layers of Black’s theory and then analyzing the variables found 
within the Arizona immigration legislation, one will begin to comprehend not only the 
accuracy of Black’s theory, but also of the magnitude and ramifications for the involved 
parties in Arizona’s immigration battle. 
3.1.1 Stratification 
 Stratification is the “vertical aspect of social life” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 11).  
Essentially, it is the allocation and dispersion of materials that are essential for living.  
These necessities, whether land, food, supplies, or livestock can range in distribution and, 
according to Black, are often dispersed unevenly within a population.  This uneven 
distribution causes the allotment issues of strife and luxury—issues that would not occur 
if the distribution rate were even and proportional.  States Black (1976, 2008): 
Stratification itself has several variable aspects.  One is the magnitude of a 
difference in wealth, or vertical distance.  Another is the degree to which 
wealth is distributed into layers, each separate from the next, rather than a 
continuum…This is vertical segmentation.  The number of these layers is 
also variable, as is the size of one in relation to another. (p. 11). 
 
 According to Baumgartner (1999), “Social stratification is inequality in the 
distribution of wealth, power, and honor.  A group of perfectly equal people has no social 
stratification at all.” (p. 8).  Black argues that the unequal dispersion of goods or 
stratification can lead to inequality in society.  Those that have luxury can be considered 
better able to handles problems, like legal interactions, than those dealing with strife or 
poverty.  That inequality will lead to different results regarding the behavior of the law.  
Black (1976, 2008) writes, “Stratification also explains law, its quantity as well as its 
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style.  It has long been recognized, for example, that wealthier people have a legal 
advantage…” (p. 12).  When different groups have different advantages during a legal 
interaction, one can suspect that the results will also be quite different.  Baumgartner 
(1999) explains, “Within a stratified society, individuals occupy social positions based on 
the relative amount of wealth and other resources they control.” (p. 8-9).  Essentially, 
Black’s theory takes into account a type of caste system that is defined by the 
individual’s amount of wealth and honor or prestige in society.  The more an individual 
has, the more likely that person will fare better in a legal encounter than someone who 
has less wealth, possessions, and honor.  
In Black’s theory, the stratification creates a vertical distance between those that 
have luxury and those that have utter poverty.  By understanding the level of stratification 
within a society, it becomes possible to understand the proportion of people or groups 
that will be subject to more law and which people and groups will be able to avoid long 
legal processes or legal interactions altogether.  According to Black (1976, 2008), “Law 
varies directly with stratification.  Thus, the more stratification a society has, the more 
law it has.” (p. 13).  In a homogeneous and economically related society, law would be 
needed less, if at all.  However, Black claims that more law is needed in a society where 
the level of wealth varies.  Furthermore, stratification does not apply to only citizen 
interactions.  Interactions between officials and citizens can also be affected by 
stratification as well.  Black (1976, 2008) states: 
Just as stratification varies between one citizen and another, so it does 
between a citizen and a legal official, such as a policeman, prosecutor, or 
judge.  Law increases with the stratification of this relationship as 
well…This applies to the relationship between an official and a defendant, 
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victim, plaintiff, or witness-whoever has a role in the case…The more 
stratified the relationship, the more law the jury is likely to apply. (p. 16). 
 
 This means that rank and status are of particular importance in Black’s theory on 
the behavior of law.  Black (1976, 2008) explains, “If people have an uneven distribution 
of wealth among themselves, or stratification, each person or group is higher or lower in 
relation to others.” (p. 16).  Thus if one individual has more wealth and is able to avoid 
legal encounters due to that wealth, that individual is then able to also have a higher rank 
in society.  However, if an individual does not have money, it is highly probable that that 
person would not be able to avoid interaction with the law in some manner, which could 
result in a lower status.  Black (1976, 2008) argues that “…people with less wealth have 
less law.  They are less likely to call upon law in their dealings with one another, an, 
when they do, they are less successful.” (p. 17). 
According to Black, the rank of an individual plays an integral part in 
understanding how law behaves.  If a police officer, who outranks a civilian, testifies in 
court, then that testimony would have more impact and importance than a regular 
individual.  Black (1976, 2008) states, “Law varies directly with rank.  This means that, 
all else constant, the lower ranks have less law then the higher ranks than the higher 
ranks, and the higher or lower they are, the more or less they have.” (p. 17).  This vertical 
distance begins to create an invisible barrier between the stratified groups.  If one group 
is aware that the law will not respond to its needs in the same manner as a higher ranking 
group, it may resort to resolving conflict internally and use the law only when the group 
is sure that success would be possible against a higher ranking group. 
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This vertical distance argument presents the final part of Black’s stratification 
explanation.  According to Black (1976, 2008), “Downward law is greater than upward 
law.” (p. 21).  For example, when a lower group or individual commits an offense against 
a higher-ranking group or individual and the wealthier individual complains, then the law 
has a downward direction.  If the opposite occurs (a person of wealth commits an offense 
against a poorer person and that individual complains) then the law has an upward 
direction.   
Black (1976, 2008) writes, “It might be noted that the vertical direction of law is 
opposite that of deviant behavior:  In response to upward deviance law has a downward 
direction, and in response to downward deviance its direction is upward.”  (p. 21).  Black 
asserts that the law is at its greatest when the group or individual with the higher rank 
and/or wealth complains against a lower individual, which is when a lower ranking 
individual commits an offense against a higher-ranking individual. 
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Black (1976, 2008) argues that “[d]ownward law varies directly with vertical 
distance” but “[u]pward law varies inversely with vertical distance.” (p. 24).  Downward 
law and upward law vary by the status of the group that is offended and by the group that 
is doing the offending. As Black (1976, 2008) explains,  
“The seriousness of an offense by a lower against a higher rank thus 
increases with the difference in wealth between the parties, whereas the 
seriousness of an offense by a higher against a lower rank decreases as this 
difference increases.  Hold the victim’s rank constant, then, and law varies 
inversely with the offender’s rank.” (p. 25).  
 
In essence, Black claims, in his theory, that the more wealth an individual or 
group has, the more benefits and advantages that person will have in the legal system.  If 
an individual or group is the offender and has less wealth or status from the victim, then 
this individual or group will have few or no advantages and benefits within the legal 
system. As Baumgartner (1999) explains, “When people have legal conflicts, where they 
stand in a status hierarchy relative to everyone else is important predictor of what is 
likely to happen.” (p. 9).  Thus, the greater the distance between the two parties on the 
social totem pole, the greater the effects of the legal system will be upon the offender. 
Finally, the stratification of a case will also predict the type or style of law that 
will be used in the case.  Black (1976, 2008) states, “Downward law is more penal than 
upward law.  In other words, where the offender’s rank is below the victim’s, his conduct 
is more likely to be punished as a crime than in a case where the direction is the 
opposite.” (p. 29).  Black explains that upward law is compensatory and more 
therapeutic.  For example, a higher-ranking individual who commits an offense against a 
lower-tiered member might pay a fine and attend counseling versus spending time in jail 
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or prison.  Black (1976, 2008) argues that “…an offender against an inferior is more 
likely to be defined as sick and in need of treatment.” (p. 29). 
The style of law will vary with the vertical distance as well.  According to Black 
(1976, 2008), “In a downward direction, the penal law varies directly with vertical 
distance, and in an upward direction it varies inversely…” (p. 29).  Essentially, the 
wealthier the victim, the greater the punishment for the offender; conversely, the poorer 
the victim, the more therapeutic or compensatory the punishment will be.  Furthermore, 
conciliatory law will be used if the social status of the two parties is equal.  Black (1976, 
2008) writes, “Conciliatory law varies inversely with stratification. (p. 30). This means 
that when the two groups are equal in their status level, they are more likely to find a 
compromise between the two groups than to punish, compensate, or require therapy for 
one of the groups.  Equals will negotiate to solve the problem, those higher up will punish 
lower level offenders, and those on the bottom may be compensated or the higher 
offender may have to seek treatment and not compensate the victim at all. 
 Therefore, with all else held constant, by examining the offender’s rank in 
relation to their victim’s, one will be able to predict whether the offender will be treated 
with upward or downward law and penal, therapeutic, compensatory, or conciliatory law.  
The level of the law and the harshness of the punishment will rest on the status level of 
the offender in relation to the victim. 
Morphology 
 Morphology is the “horizontal aspect of social life” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 37).  In 
essence, this means that the distribution of people across society will vary.  This 
distribution can include the “division of labor, networks of interactions, intimacy, and 
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integration” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 37).  Morphology is the differentiation of people and 
how those different groups rely upon each other.  Some individuals will specialize into 
specific groups, such as, lawyers, law enforcement, and doctors, and each specific group 
will rely upon a different entity within society in order to fully function.  These 
specializations increase the differentiation between groups, thereby increasing the 
morphology in society.  According to Baumgartner (1999), “Social morphology refers to 
patterns of interpersonal association and connection.” (p. 9).  The degree in which people 
and/or groups are integrated into the society and the dependence of the two parties is the 
measurement for social morphology. 
Black (1976, 2008) asserts that, “Law varies directly with differentiation, to a 
point, then reverses itself:  The relationship between law and differentiation is 
curvilinear.” (p. 39).  In other words law will increase with differentiation, in order to 
regulation the interactions between the various and diverse groups.  However, the amount 
of law will decline as symbiosis enters the framework.  Black (1976, 2008) states, “As 
social life evolves beyond interdependence to symbiosis, however, law decreases.” (p. 
40).  When symbiosis occurs, the groups’ dependence will result in a decrease in law.  As 
seen with the stratification section, the more the groups become similar, the more they 
will negotiate and reconcile versus punishing or compensating each other.  That relational 
distance also impacts the amount of law that will exist in society.  States Black (1976, 
2008), “The relationship between law and relational distance is curvilinear.”  (p. 41).  
This means that those with a close relationship or the groups that have reached symbiosis 
will not or rarely involve the law in conflicts.  As the distance between the groups’ 
relationship expands, more law will be incorporated.  The amount of law will peak when 
33 
the interaction is between two groups that are strangers.  The style of law will also vary 
with the distance between the two groups.  Groups with closer relationships may choose 
compromise while groups that are unfamiliar with each other may choose penal law.  
Black (1976, 2008) explains, “Thus, all else constant, strangers are more likely to oppose 
one another as adversaries, whereas intimates are more likely to offer help…” (p. 47). 
The next section of morphology focuses on the group’s integration within social 
life.  According to Black (1976, 2008), “Law varies directly with integration.” (p. 49).  
Thus those individuals or groups who are close to the center of society and social life will 
have “more law than those further out” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 49).  The groups that are 
closely tied with society will use the law to settle disputes versus groups that reside on 
the fringes of society.  Groups that remain outside the center of social life may have other 
tactics for dealing with conflict. 
The final section of morphology centers around how centrifugal and centripetal 
law interact with the individuals and groups in society.  The first premise of this principle 
on centrifugal and centripetal law states, “Centrifugal law is greater than centripetal law.” 
(Black, 1976, 2008, p. 50).  Thus, if an individual or group who is not integrated within 
society commits an offense against an integrated individual or group, the punishment and 
amount of law involved will be quite severe.  This premise is similarly related to the 
downward/upward law found in stratification.  The group that is most closely tied to 
society will have the benefit of the judicial system in both punishing the offender and 
being relieved of committing an offense.  Black (1976, 2008) also states, “Centrifugal 
law varies directly with radial distance.” But, “Centripetal law varies inversely with 
radial distance.” (p. 50).  This indicates that the likelihood for success of an integrated 
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group or person will vary on the integration level of the opposing party.  Black (1976, 
2008) explains, 
…the likelihood of a complaint by an integrated person against a marginal 
person increases with the difference in integration between them, as does 
the likelihood that the complaint will succeed.  But the likelihood of a 
complaint in the opposite direction, from a marginal person against 
someone more integrated, decreases as the difference between them 
increases, and the same applies to the success of complaint.  It follows 
that, all else constant-including the radial status of the offender-law varies 
directly with the integration of the victim.  And all else constant-including 
the status of the victim-law varies inversely with the integration of the 
offender.  First consider the offender. (p. 50-51). 
 
 This segment of Black’s theory, illustrates how the specialized groups interact 
within the society.  While fascinating, it will not have much impact on the analysis of the 
Arizona legislation.  The other four topics (stratification, culture, organization, and social 
control) will be fundamental in analyzing the Arizona immigration legislation. 
Culture 
 The next section, culture, is best described as the expressive activities of a 
particular group or society.  As Black (1976, 2008) defines it, “Culture is the symbolic 
aspect of social life, including expressions of what is true, good, and beautiful.” (p. 61).  
This culture can range from expressive dance, artwork, music, or any form or medium 
that can specifically translate the values of a particular group to the viewing audience.  As 
Black explains, culture is separate from the way people may experience culture.  The 
culture of a group can be shown and shared with another group, but the experience of 
another group’s culture is entirely separate from the viewing group’s culture and values.  
Culture can also fluctuate in its quantity and behaves differently for each particular 
group. 
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 Culture can vary in its quantity, and when this happens the law will vary as well.  
Black (1976, 2008) explains, “Law varies directly with culture.” (p. 63).  Thus when a 
society has little culture, it will also have little law.  The same is true for a society rich in 
culture—it will also be rich in law.  This concept of high culture and high law levels is 
inherently connected to the education level.  According to Black, the more culture a 
group has, the higher the education level for the group will be.  However, as Black (1976, 
2008) points out, “Accordingly, law varies directly with literacy and education.  Literate 
and educated people are more likely to bring lawsuits against each other…” (p. 64).  
Therefore as culture increases, education will increase, and law ultimately will increase 
since it is inherently connected to the culture and education levels. 
 The next premises of Black’s culture argument rest on the interaction between 
groups with different or no culture at all.  The law will behave differently in each 
scenario.  Black’s first premise states, “Law is greater in a direction toward less culture 
than toward more culture.” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 65).  This signifies that if a person who 
has less culture commits an offense against a person with more culture, the law will be 
greater and the offense is considered more serious.  However, in the opposite direction, if 
a person with more culture commits an offense against a party that has less culture, the 
offense will be considered less serious. 
 Black (1976, 2008) next contends that “In a direction toward less culture, law 
varies directly with cultural distance.”  But “In a direction toward more culture, law 
varies inversely with cultural distance.” (p. 65).  Thus if the offender is less educated, the 
offense is greater.  However, if the offender is more educated than the victim, the offense 
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is the opposite—it is lesser, especially as the gap between the education levels between 
the two parties widens. 
 The next premise of Black’s cultural theory contends that, “Law varies directly 
with conventionality.” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 68).  This premise implies that as law gets 
closer to the generally accepted principles of a society (what one could call “mainstream 
society”), the law of the society will increase.  The further one travels from the generally 
accepted principals, the less law one will encounter.  Black contends that groups within 
the society are more likely to involve law in their interactions with similar groups, than 
with dissimilar groups.  Black (1976, 2008) also purports that “Law is greater in a 
direction toward less conventionality than toward more conventionality.” (p. 69).  Thus if 
an unconventional (or non-mainstream) individual or group commits an offense against a 
conventional individual or group, the offense will be regarded as more serious than an 
offense occurring in the opposite direction.  A higher educated, wealthier individual 
would be less accountable for an offense against a lower status, less educated, poorer 
individual.  If the reverse were to happen, the offender (in this case the poorer individual) 
would be more accountable and the offense would be considered greater.  Black contends 
that as groups’ cultures become intermixed and become a new “conventional,” the 
quantity of law will be more equal. 
 Black (1976, 2008) next contends, “The relationship between law and cultural 
distance is curvilinear.” (p. 74).  Like all the other curvilinear models in Black’s theory 
on the behavior of law, at the extremes of the bell curve, the amount of law is the least.  
The peak of the amount of law is at the crest of the bell curve.  When there is little to no 
diversity, or when there are extreme poles of diversity, then the amount of law is minute.  
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However, when there is a mix of cultural diversity between the different groups, the 
amount of law is at its highest.  Black (1976, 2008) explains, “Hold constant all but the 
diversity of culture, compare societies of every kind, and law is greater where culture is 
more diverse in the daily life of people.” (p. 75).  One could contend, particularly when 
there is little law with extremely diverse groups, that those groups who try to intermingle 
their cultures, or if one group attempts to adopt the mainstream culture, there will end up 
being more law and more legal interaction than if the groups were to remain separate. 
 The style of law also varies with the amount of cultural distance between the 
groups.  Black (1976, 2008) explains, “All else constant, penal law varies directly with 
cultural distance.” (p. 78).  The more closely related the group’s cultures are, the more 
likely therapeutic or conciliatory law will be applied.  The farther apart the groups’ 
cultures are, the more likely penal and compensatory law will be used. 
Organization 
 Organization is the measurement of cooperation in society.  Black (1976, 2008) 
defines it in the following way: “Organization is the corporate aspect of social life, the 
capacity for collective action.” (p. 85).  According to Baumgartner (1999), “In modern 
societies, this aspect of social life is embodied most dramatically in the many formally 
structured groups, such as business corporations, that pursue a common agenda over long 
periods of time.” (p. 11).  Essentially, organization in Black’s theory measures the 
interaction between individuals and artificial individuals.  The level of cooperation 
between the two types of individuals creates the organizational level of society. 
 Black’s first premise regarding organization is that, “Law varies directly with 
organization.” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 86).  This means that the more a society can 
38 
cooperate with different groups to achieve goals, the higher the amount of law will exist 
in society.  When an event happens such as a flood or war, the law will increase as more 
groups team up and work together to solve the problem.  As collective action increases, 
the law increases.  Black (1976, 2008) also explains that, “Law is greater in a direction 
toward less organization than toward more organization.” (p. 92).  Therefore, a large 
organization, or an artificial individual, is more likely to make a complaint against an 
individual or smaller organization than the opposite occurring.   
Black (1976, 2008) continues, “In a direction toward less organization, law varies 
directly with organizational distance.”  But, “In a direction toward more organization, 
law varies inversely with organizational distance.” (p. 93).  The larger and more 
organized a group is, the more successful its interactions with the law will be.  If the 
opposite occurs and an individual brings a complaint against an organization, then the 
success rate will be minimal.  As Black (1976, 2008) explains, “…all else constant…law 
varies inversely with the organization of the offender.  And, all else constant…law varies 
directly with the organization of the victim.  First consider the offender.” (p. 93).  
Essentially, the greater the distance between the organization of the individual and the 
large corporation the less likely the individual will succeed against the group.  However, 
if the corporation is highly organized and brings a complaint against an individual or 
smaller group, it will likely succeed.  The success or failure rate will depend on the size 
and organization of the particular offending group that is being examined. Baumgartner 
(1999) elaborates by writing that, 
…there are important social differences between organizations and 
individuals.  Organizations generally command more wealth, expertise, 
and other resources than individuals, and their relations with outsiders are 
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likely to be more impersonal and more narrowly focused.  In dealings 
between organizations and individuals, the former generally enjoy an 
advantage over the latter… (p. 11). 
 
 As Black explains, the organization will have a higher likelihood of lodging a 
complaint against an individual, compared to an individual against an organization.  The 
most law or punishment that will result is when an individual commits an offense against 
an organization.  Since this group has the higher likelihood of making a complaint, the 
fact that an individual would commit an offense against the organization means that the 
law will be the greatest in dealing with the offending individual. 
Social Control 
 The final section of Black’s theory on the behavior of law entails social control.  
This, according to Black (1976, 2008), is the “normative aspect of social life.” (p. 105).  
Social control pertains to the various forms of rules and regulations that exist within 
society to guide an individual to behave a certain way.  Law is one facet of social 
control—a control that is run by the government.  However, family, customs, ethics and 
other behavioral regulations are also other forms of social control.  As Baumgartner adds, 
“Law is not the only method people use to deal with behavior of which they disapprove.  
It is, in fact, only one of a number of techniques of social control that can be employed.” 
(Baumgartner, 1999, p. 12).  This aspect of Black’s theory measures the quantity of other 
non-law authority and analyzes whether law is stronger or weaker in the presence of these 
other aspects of social control. 
 When the other aspects of social control are weak, the law becomes stronger.  
According to Black (1976, 2008), “Law varies inversely with other social control.” (p. 
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107).  As the other facets of social control decrease, be it family, cultural, or ethical, the 
law increases to prevent undesirable behavior.  When the social control is strong on a 
non-legal level, the law does not usually become involved and its influence decreases.  
For example, if there is a conflict between individuals or a group of the same family or 
culture, then those involved parties will probably settle the issue internally using specific 
terms and conditions related to their group instead of involving the law.  However, when 
the non-legal social control has diminished or is non-existent, the law must be evoked in 
order to settle the dispute.  Without the law, resolution would not take place. 
 Social control defines what is and is not deviant.  Black (1976, 2008) states, 
“…the more social control to which it is subject, the more deviant the conduct is.” (p. 9).  
Similarly, just as social control defines what is deviant behavior by attempting to prevent 
said behavior, social control also defines who is deviant and who is “respectable” (Black, 
1976, 2008, p. 111).  Respectability does not vary in the same manner as stratification 
and wealth.  Rather, respectability transcends the issue of wealth.  As Black points out, an 
individual can be wealthy but not respected.  The reverse can also occur; an individual 
may be poor but highly respected within the community.  It follows that “Law varies 
directly with respectability.” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 112).  Individuals who are not 
respectable will have less law amongst themselves, while those who are considered 
respectable will use more law. 
 Therefore, if an unrespectable individual attempts to use the law against a 
respectable person, that person is unlikely to succeed.  The opposite also holds true.  If a 
highly respectable individual invokes the law, they have a higher probability of 
succeeding in a legal interaction.  Furthermore, if an individual of low respectability 
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status commits a crime against an equally low level individual, the result will be minimal 
or even non-existent in the legal environment.  Black claims that such individuals are not 
likely to bring a claim against the offender. 
 Black (1976, 2008) also contends, “Law is greater in a direction toward less 
respectability than toward more respectability.” (p. 114).  This indicates that an 
individual who is less respectable will be subject to the law more often and not enjoy the 
benefits of the law as often as an individual with a high respectability level.  If a highly 
respectable person lodges a complaint against a lower level individual, then the former 
will likely succeed versus the opposite occurring.  In this instance, status (as found in 
stratification) can intermingle with respectability.  If the individual has high status and 
respectability, such as a police officer, then the word or testimony of that individual will 
be worth more than a respectable individual, and even more than a non-respected 
individual or group. 
 Black also purports that an individual who has been subject to the law and has 
less respectability is also “vulnerable” to the law as well.  Black (1976, 2008) explains, 
“Anyone who has been subject to social control has less protection, and any such person 
is more vulnerable to law as well.” (p. 116).  Any individual or group that now carries a 
record of suffering a sanction by the law will be vulnerable to legal interaction, 
particularly unsuccessful legal interactions, in the future.  Due to the previous legal 
interaction, the group or individual has lost respectability.  With that loss comes the 
vulnerability to the law, reduced legal protection, and a minimized success rate for 
sanctions against respectable groups or individuals.  According to Black (1976, 2008), 
“In a direction toward less respectability, law varies directly with normative distance.” 
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But, “In a direction toward more respectability, law varies inversely with normative 
distance.” (p. 117).  As previously explained, if an individual is a past offender, then that 
person will likely be subject to more law in the future.  If the individual or group is 
respectable, then a lower amount of law, if any law at all, will be applied to the situation. 
f. Conclusion 
 What can be derived from Black’s theory of law?  If presented with a fact pattern, 
how can one determine what will be the legal conclusion and how will the law behave?  
How would one analyze the Arizona immigration legislation?  Baumgartner answers that, 
Every person who becomes involved in any way in a legal matter 
contributes something to its outcome.  Each brings a social identity to the 
case that affects how it is handled; each helps to determine what Black 
calls the ‘social structure of the case’…It is, then, through the 
characteristics of all people who participate in cases that the independent 
variables…find their entry into the legal arena. (Baumgartner, 1999, p. 
13). 
 
 By analyzing all the involved parties, one can begin to determine who will 
succeed, who will be punished, and at what level the individual or group will suffer a 
sanction.  By analyzing the stratification and determining the level of wealth between the 
participants one can begin to analyze and determine the result of the legislation.  
Additionally by understanding the culture and how law interacts with this facet of 
society, one can ascertain who will be punished and to what extent.  Finally, by analyzing 
organization and social control, one will discover who or what will be successful in a 
legal interaction and who will be considered respectable and highly regarded in the eyes 
of the law.  Each of these facets in Black’s theory plays a role in determining the final 
outcome of a legal interaction. When all of these factors combine, the answer becomes 
clear—it becomes necessary to address the issues that prevent some groups, based on 
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legal limitations due to their identities, from receiving fair treatment in the legal realm 
and question why such restrictions are allowed to continue.  In sum, it becomes necessary 






















3.2 Blackian Analysis of the Arizona Immigration Legislation 
 It has been shown in the analysis of Black’s theory on the behavior of law that an 
individual’s interaction with law itself is malleable and not a rigid equation that will 
automatically (and blindly) produce a fair and impartial result.  Rather, the factors that 
permeate U.S. society also seep into the justice system and produce legal results that take 
into account the status, wealth, respectability, and organizational skills of each participant 
before rendering a result.  As previously explained, there are some groups that are given 
preferential treatment.  The group at the bottom is left to fend for itself and faces the legal 
system without the perks and benefits that the groups at the top of the totem pole receive. 
Black’s theory on the behavior law explains how and why law behaves a 
particular way.  His theory explains the infrastructure of the law, answering the questions 
of why and what particular motivations could be behind the power structure setup in 
legislation or legal interactions.  Black (1976, 2008) explains, “By implication, these 
propositions also predict and explain many facts usually addressed by theories of deviant 
behavior, and reformulated, they predict and explain other kinds of social control.” (p. 
ix).  While these variables have different layers and distributions in society, when they 
come together, they create an infrastructure that is powerful enough to predict how law 
will behave and also show why it behaves in that particular way.   
For example, Black (1976, 2008) states, “Law varies inversely with other social 
control.” (p. 107).  While on its face this may seem irrelevant to the Arizona immigration 
legislation, what Black’s proposition means is that law becomes stronger as other forms 
of social control become weaker.  Social control can vary in an individual’s life, be they 
family, job, education, etc.  However, once those forces of social control are diminished 
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(such as through an individual’s immigration to another location) then the law will 
increase in strength to compensate for those missing factors of social control.  If enough 
individuals immigrate, then the laws might go into “overdrive” if a large enough 
population is missing other forms of social control.   
This paper analyzes and addresses the following topics: stratification, culture, 
organization, and social control within the scope of the Arizona immigration legislation. 
By analyzing said legislation, this paper provides a clear understanding of the factors that 
controlled the construction of the legislation and the implications for the groups at the 
bottom of the legal and societal totem pole. 
3.2.1 Stratification 
 Stratification, which is the vertical aspect in societal life, relates to the distributive 
wealth across a particular society.   Those that have more wealth have more distance from 
those that have the least.  That distance in the vertical space between the groups or 
individuals is what demarcates the advantages and disadvantages each group will have 
during a legal interaction.  As more stratification is created and sustained in a society, so 
too will more law be introduced and enforced within said society.  As Black (1976, 2008) 
explains, “If people have an uneven distribution of wealth among themselves, or 
stratification, each person or group is higher or lower in relation to others.” (p. 16).  This 
inherent caste system makes the probability of an increase in law highly likely as more 
“outsiders” begin to move into a particular society. 
 When a new group immigrates to an area, it can be assumed that a large 
proportion of newly arrived immigrants (whether legally or illegally present) will be 
grouped along with other similar individuals somewhere along the economic spectrum 
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within the new community.  Familiarity with others alone is enough to affect 
stratification.  Black (1976, 2008) states, “…for that matter, the same applies across 
settings of every kind, even within a single community. There is less law among 
neighbors, colleagues, friends-less wherever people are more equal.” (p. 15).  Naturally, 
newly arrived individuals or those perceived not to be “engrained” within the community 
will be viewed as outsiders and not truly considered a neighbor or friend.  When this 
perception occurs, the law increases.  According to Black (1976, 2008), “Legislation 
increases, as do policing and inspection, litigation, damages, and punishment. People 
become more litigious.” (p. 15). 
 Similarities can be seen regarding the Arizona immigration legislation.  
According to the Arizona State Senate fact sheet for S.B. 1070, the purpose of the 
legislation is that it, 
Requires officials and agencies of the state and political subdivisions to 
fully comply with and assist in the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws and gives county attorneys subpoena power in certain investigations 
of employers. Establishes crimes involving trespassing by illegal aliens, 
stopping to hire or soliciting work under specified circumstances, and 
transporting, harboring or concealing unlawful aliens, and their respective 
penalties. (“Fact Sheet”, 2010, p. 1). 
 
 According to Black, the increase in legislation is an expected outcome due to the 
increase in the population of individuals who are considered by society as “unequal” in 
light of material wealth and economic distribution.  When there is an increase in law, as 
Black points out, there will also be an increase in inspections and investigations.  The 
Arizona State Senate fact sheet for S.B. 1070 shows that with the new legislation will 
also come an increase in inspections from law enforcement.  The bill, S.B. 1070, itself 
states that the true purpose of the legislation is: 
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…is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state 
and local government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are 
intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and 
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in 
the United States. (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, p.1). 
 
 Legality of the immigrant aside, the main purpose of the act is to deter a particular 
group from residing in the state.  Thereby proving Black’s point: stratification will induce 
certain reactions by the law.  Again with legal status aside, would the law deter if an 
entering group were wealthy?  The first underlying issue that affects how the law behaves 
is wealth.  If a society thinks that a particular group is draining the resources from the 
community instead of enhancing it, then it is highly probable that that society will want to 
deter that group from settling in the community. 
 Black also contends that the rank of an individual will also increase or decrease 
the law.  Lower ranks will use and rely upon the law less while higher ranks will depend 
upon the law more.  According to the Arizona State Legislature, Russell Pearce, the 
President of the Senate and self-proclaimed author S.B. 1070 (“Enough is Enough”, 
2010, p. 1), is a fifth generation Arizonan.  He was also a “Chief Deputy for 23 years 
with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office” (“Russell Pearce”, 2011, p.1).  Moreover, he 
was the “…first North Mesa Justice of the Peace” (“Russell Pearce”, 2011, p.1).  He has 
two sons in law enforcement and he is the current “State Senator from Legislative District 
18” (“Russell Pearce”, 2011, p.1) among a plethora of other community-based 
employment opportunities.  He is the quintessential higher-ranked and community-
engrained individual that Black describes when comparing lower ranks to higher ranks.  
Pearce undoubtedly outranks an immigrant and he relies heavily upon the law for results 
(even writing legislation for an intended result). 
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 The final premise of Black’s stratification theory describes the direction of the 
law in relation to the status of the group or individual.  As previously discussed, 
“Downward law is greater than upward law.” (Black, 1976, 2008. p. 21).  As Black 
explains, the direction of the law will be opposite of the deviant behavior.  If a lower 
group offends a higher-ranking group, then the law will be stricter and have a downward 
direction.  An offense by a lower ranking individual or group against a higher-ranking 
group is the greatest offense and warrants the greatest amount of law as a response.  
Similarly, with the Arizona legislation, the group being offended (the state and its 
engrained members) are higher ranking than the lower group (the immigrants and new 
members).  However, it is a perceived infringement that the state is attempting to address.  
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 
According to Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the 2008 American 
Community Survey, there are 2 million Hispanics in Arizona, representing 
30% of the state’s population. One-third (33%) of Arizona Hispanics are 
foreign born…. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that approximately 
500,000 undocumented immigrants resided in Arizona in 2008. Nearly all 
(94%) of these undocumented immigrants are from Mexico. Moreover, 
approximately 10% of Arizona’s workforce is undocumented (Passel and 
Cohn, 2009). (Hispanics and Arizona’s New Immigration Law, 2010, p. 
5). 
 
Essentially, two-thirds of the Arizonan Hispanics are native or U.S. born.  
Furthermore, if only 10% of Arizona’s workforce and 500,000 out of the 2 million 
Hispanics in the state are undocumented, does it justify a stricter legislative response than 
the one imposed by the federal government? Thus, according to Black, a perceived 
infringement by this group against the state will warrant the largest legal response, and in 
this case, new legislation with stricter punishments for violations. 
 This position is further cemented, for example, by §13-2928 of S.B. 1070.  This 
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section of the legislation states that any “unlawful” stopping to pick up and hire 
passengers for work in a street, solicitation for work at a roadway, or acceptance of work 
in a roadway are all punishable by law.  S.B. 1070 declares: 
A. It is unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a 
street, roadway or highway to attempt to hire or hire and pick up 
passengers for work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or 
impedes the normal movement of traffic.   
B. It is unlawful for a person to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped on a 
street, roadway or highway in order to be hired by an occupant of the 
motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location if the 
motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic. (House 
Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, p.7). 
 
It is clear from the language of the statute that the legislature is targeting a group 
that feels the need to solicit work from the curbside or from the side of a road.  One can 
confidently affirm that someone who works for the state legislature or anyone from the 
highest ranking community group would not feel the need or even have the inclination to 
solicit temporary work from a roadway.  Of particular importance is the fact that these 
two sections do not define the legal status of the individuals soliciting for work or those 
hiring.  In fact, section C of §13-2928 clearly differs from section A and B by beginning 
with the phrase, “ It is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the United 
States and who is an unauthorized alien….” (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, 
p.7).  Sections A and B apply the new law to the entire group of individuals in the lower 
tiered group.  Black’s theory is again supported. An infraction by the lowest group (for 
example, illegal immigration) against a higher group (the state) results in the harshest 
application of law (preventing the entire lower group for soliciting for temporary work).  
Black (1989) states, 
Insofar as the social structure of a case predicts how it will be 
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handled…the extent of structural differences among and between cases 
will determine the extent of legal variations across them.  If different 
degrees of intimacy divide the adversaries from one case to the next, for 
example, or different levels of social status, of if the legal officials 
handling them differ in their social characteristics, the legal outcomes will 
vary to a greater extent than if the cases are more similar.  In other words: 
Legal variation is a direct function of social diversity. (p. 59). 
 
 As Black also points out, the stratification in a society also predicts the style of 
law that is used in each instance.  Black (1976, 2008) writes, “Downward law is more 
penal than upward law.” (p. 29).  With this piece of legislation, violation of only section 
§13-2928 could result in a “Class 1 Misdemeanor” (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 
2010, p.7).  The entire bill relies upon compensatory and penal law in order to punish the 
violators of the various sections.  Some sections result in penal punishment and/or 
incarceration while other sections require a payment to the state in the form a fine. Black 
predicts that societies with little or no stratification will rely upon therapeutic and 
conciliatory law in order to resolve conflict.  With a society that is plagued with 
stratification, the result of a legal contact will be penal law with an intermixing of 
compensatory law, which is seen in the Arizona immigration legislation. 
Culture 
 Culture, which is the symbolic aspect of society life, includes “expression of what 
is true, good, and beautiful.” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 61).  In essence, anything that 
translates the values of a particular group can be regarded as culture.  Poetry, religion, 
values, science, and technology can all be regarded as facets of a group’s culture.  Black 
(1976, 2008) explains that “Law varies directly with culture” (p. 63), meaning that when 
there is little culture there is a low amount of law.  However, when there is a high level of 
culture, especially during the intermixing of various different cultures, the law will be 
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greater.   
 Black (1976, 2008) also asserts that “Law varies directly with conventionality.” 
(p. 68).  As previously discussed, society has generally accepted principles which are 
considered “mainstream”.  When law moves closer to the mainstream of society it 
increases; and law decreases as it moves further away from the mainstream.  However, 
“Law is greater in a direction toward less conventionality than toward more 
conventionality.” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 69).  If a group or individual has culture, which 
is considered not “mainstream” and commits an offense against an individual or group 
with mainstream culture, then the offense and the law involved are greater than if the 
reverse were to occur. 
 Black (1976, 2008) also states, “The relationship between law and cultural 
distance is curvilinear.” (p. 74).  The peak of the involvement of law occurs when 
multiple cultures are intermixing versus when there is no culture or when the cultural 
diversity is so great that blending is not possible.  Black (1976, 2008) adds, “…law is 
greater where culture is more diverse in the daily life of people.” (p. 75). 
 With the Arizona immigration issue, another facet of the problem lies with the 
intermixing of the cultures.  Just as Black predicted, when the cultures begin to blend, the 
law is at its peak.  However, the “mainstream” American culture is radically different 
from the influx of cultures from south of the border that the law becomes greater towards 
the culture that is “toward less conventionality” (Black, 1976, 2008, p. 69).  Thus, if one 
were to express his/her culture in a society with a high level of law existing in society, 
then that person could become vulnerable to the law.  Black (1976, 2008) emphasizes that 
“Any person who is unconventional in his dress, speech, manner, ideas, or anything else, 
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is more vulnerable to law of every kind…In general, the more a person resembles his 
neighbors, the more he blend into the crowd, the more immunity from law he enjoys.” (p. 
71). 
 For example, S.B. 1070 states in §11-1051: 
B. For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by a law enforcement 
official or a law enforcement agency of this state or a law enforcement 
official or a law enforcement agency of a county, city, town or other 
political subdivision of this state in the enforcement of any other law or 
ordinance of a county, city or town or this state where reasonable 
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the 
United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to 
determine the immigration status of the person, except if the determination 
may hinder or obstruct an investigation. (House Engrossed Senate Bill 
1070, 2010, p.2). (Emphasis added). 
 
 However, the phrase “where reasonable suspicion exists,” begs the question, 
What does raise a suspicion of illegality without racial profiling entering the picture?  
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the definition of suspicion and reasonable 
suspicion vary significantly.   
 Suspicion: “The apprehension or imagination of the existence of something wrong 
based only on inconclusive or slight evidence, or possibly even no evidence.” 
(“Suspicion”, 2009, p. 1585). 
 Reasonable suspicion: “A particularized and objective basis, supported by specific 
and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity.  A police officer must 
have a reasonable suspicion to stop a person in a public place.” (“Reasonable suspicion”, 
2009, p. 1585). 
 The bright line for determining “reasonable suspicion” becomes muddied with the 
Arizona’s P.O.S.T. list of identifying characteristics.  Traveling in tandem or different 
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demeanor seems to be based more within the parameters of “suspicion” instead of 
“reasonable suspicion.”  Such identifiers seem to open the door to pretexual stops rather 
than truly legal interactions.   
So what are the effects of “reasonable suspicion” as defined by Arizona?  
According to L. Darnell Weeden, author of the article entitled, “It is Discriminatory for 
Arizona or Society to Engage in the Anti-Immigration Practice of Profiling Hispanics for 
Speaking Spanish,” individuals may feel vulnerable to the law if they speak Spanish in 
public.  Weeden (2010) defines that the term “Hispanic in appearance” denoting,  
“…anyone who is at great risk of being label as an undocumented or 
unauthorized immigrant from Mexico. The point of such legislation is that 
any person in Arizona whose appearance suggests that she may be linked 
to Mexico is likely to be presumed as an undocumented alien, regardless 
of her actual immigration status, citizenship or country of origin.” (109).  
 
A major concern with the Arizona legislation is the impact these laws will have 
upon the ability to speak Spanish in public.  Weeden fears that speaking one’s native 
tongue (Spanish) in public will give incentive to law enforcement to find reasons to 
initiate a lawful contact after hearing an individual speaking his/her native tongue.   
It is obvious the scope of S.B. 1070 includes citizens because one cannot 
reasonably tell by sight alone if a person is an immigrant or citizen. Under 
the Supreme Court's regrettable interpretation of the constitution's 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, it is permissible for 
law enforcement officers in Arizona to practice de facto national origin or 
ethnic profiling by lawfully stopping a person for a minor traffic violation 
while specifically targeting them for a violation of Arizona's anti-Hispanic 
immigrant law. (Weeden, 2010, p. 113). 
 
 Weeden further argues that speaking Spanish in public would give law 
enforcement officers reasonable suspicion that an individual might be an illegal 
immigrant.  The cascading effect of such fear would result in a mandatory, but unofficial, 
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policy of speaking English in public in order to diminish suspicion or detection.  Weeden 
(2010) elaborates by writing, 
A person speaking Spanish in public in Arizona is likely to be targeted for 
traffic stops or jay walking by the police in order to justify checking that 
person's immigration status. In Arizona, if an individual is stopped by the 
police, even for a minor traffic violation, the implications of S.B. 1070 
come into effect. The officer is substantially certain to presume that a 
person is in Arizona illegally and demand proof of federal immigration 
status if he or she is Hispanic in appearance and speaks to the police in 
Spanish. (p. 113-114). 
 
 The unofficial policy of English only would, in essence, create a chilling effect on 
the speech of the Spanish-speaking individuals.  Weeden (2010) adds: 
In Whren the Supreme Court held that a brief stopping of a driver based 
on probable cause that he committed a minor traffic offense does not 
breach the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable seizures, 
although a reasonable officer would not have blocked the drivers 
movement for some other law enforcement purpose. n31 As a practical 
matter, a person Hispanic in appearance will be burdened with carrying 
identification to show he is lawfully in Arizona, while those who are not 
Hispanic in appearance will generally not have to meet such a burden. 
Arizona's anti-Hispanic immigrant law, S.B. 1070, is likely to have a 
chilling effect on the right of a person of Hispanic appearance to express 
cultural identity by speaking Spanish in the public square because of the 
unreasonable risk of ethnic and national origin profiling by the police. (p. 
113). 
 
 As Black has written, anything that makes an individual “unconventional”, 
including his speech, makes him more vulnerable to the law.  Those that blend in with the 
mainstream enjoy more protection, while those that do not or cannot hide their 
unconventional characteristics and culture will be subject to more law. 
Organization 
 Organization relates to the collective or cooperation aspect between individuals 
and corporations.  The types of organizations that exist within society and the quantity of 
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organizations in a particular society affect how much law exists within a society.  Black 
(1976, 2008) contends that, “Law is greater in a direction toward less organization than 
toward more organization.” (p. 92).  Therefore, a business or other group will be more 
likely to lodge a complaint about an issue and is more likely to succeed in the long run.  
According to Black (1976, 2008), “All else constant, then, a business or other 
organization is more likely to complain to the police about an individual than vice versa, 
and, when this happens, an arrest is more likely, as is a confession, prosecution, 
conviction, and severe sentence…Similarly, a group is more likely to bring a lawsuit to 
win…” (p. 92).  As seen in the stratification section, the highest-ranking group can be 
classified as the group(s) with the most organization.  The most organized group will 
usually be the most stratified.  The most stratified groups typically have the most 
protection and immunity from the law.  Black (1976, 2008) affirms this by stating, 
“Organization provides an immunity from law, and the more organized the offender, the 
more of this immunity is enjoyed.” (p. 93). 
 First and foremost, the state is the most organized collective in a society.  The 
state makes the rules and enforces the rules.  When law originates from a specific 
organization, one can infer that this particular group will also enjoy particular immunity 
from the law itself.  For example, when examining the Arizona immigration legislation, 
one can see that the state provides an incentive for itself to enforce the legislation.  S.B. 
1070 § 11-1051 declares: 
H. A person who is a legal resident of this state may bring an action in 
superior court to challenge any official or agency of this state or a county, 
city, town, or other political subdivision of this state that adopts or 
implements a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal 
immigration laws, including 8 United States Code Sections 1373 and 
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1644, to less than the full extend permitted by federal law. (House 
Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, p.4). 
 
 The state relies upon the justification that a citizen could sue the state if a 
particular entity does not fully enforce the legislation.  Such circular wording justifies and 
excuses the state from such action and strict enforcement due to the threat of a civil 
action from a shadowy and vengeful citizen-even though such a weakness was put in 
place by the state.  The group that is the most organized enjoys the most protection.  The 
state of Arizona wishes to have the strictest and strongest enforcement of the legislation 
from all state entities.  To ensure this level of enforcement, the state allows for the threat 
of civil lawsuits.  However, the state does not want to be sued and will be forced to apply 
the strictest and strongest enforcement of the legislation from all state entities.  In 
essence, the state tries to appear duty-bound with circumscribed power.  The state 
furthers verifies such a claim with the following from S.B. 1070 § 11-1051: 
…If there is a judicial finding that an entity has violated this section, the 
court shall order that the entity pay a civil penalty of not less that five 
hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars for each day that 
the policy has remained in effect after the filing of an action pursuant to 
this subsection. 
 
I. A court shall collect the civil penalty prescribed in subsection H of this 
section and remit the civil penalty to the state treasurer for deposit in the 
Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission Fund 
established by section 41-1724. (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 2010, 
p.4). 
 
 Essentially, the state would allow itself to be sued and then pay itself to enforce 
the legislation.  Besides having to pay for the legal costs of the prevailing individual, 
official, or agency, the state would lose no money from such a suit.  However, the 
implication would be that the state would try to avoid such a civil action, which would, in 
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turn, justify the strict enforcement of the legislation.  Another implication of this segment 
of the law is that it allows for any person to sue the government for enforcement.  Now 
any private citizen could sue for perceived illegal immigration and force the Arizona to 
enforce the legislation to the strictest standard. 
 Secondly, the more organized a group becomes, the more successful it is in its 
complaint and invocation of law.  If two organizations come together to create law, one 
can safely assume that the organizational skills of these two groups will be the most 
successful against the lower tiered groups and/or individuals.  According to National 
Public Radio (NPR), there are connections between the Arizona immigration legislation 
and the private prison corporations.  Laura Sullivan, author of the article “Prison 
Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law” writes: 
NPR spent the past several months analyzing hundreds of pages of 
campaign finance reports, lobbying documents and corporate records. 
What they show is a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to help draft and pass 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070 by an industry that stands to benefit from it: the 
private prison industry. 
 
The law could send hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants to prison 
in a way never done before. And it could mean hundreds of millions of 
dollars in profits to private prison companies responsible for housing 
them. 
 
Arizona State Sen. Russell Pearce says the bill was his idea. He says it's 
not about prisons. It's about what's best for the country… But instead of 
taking his idea to the Arizona statehouse floor, Pearce first took it to a 
hotel conference room. 
 
It was last December at the Grand Hyatt in Washington, D.C. Inside, there 
was a meeting of a secretive group called the American Legislative 
Exchange Council. Insiders call it ALEC. (“Prison Economics”, 2010, p. 
2). 
 
 The newsgroup alleges that Pearce, who claims to have written the bill himself, 
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met with the Corrections Corporation of America and other private prison companies in 
order to draft legislation with other American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 
members, including other legislators and other corporations.  While not illegal, it does 
cause one to question the motives of both the state and the legislature, if the main author 
behind the bill is actually a privatized prison corporation. 
 ALEC, which NPR explains is a membership organization, allows members to 
attend annual conferences where legislative discussions and drafting of “model bills” 
occur.  Laura Sullivan, author of the article “Shaping State Laws With Little Scrutiny” 
claims that: 
The largest prison company in the country, the Corrections Corporation of 
America, was present when the model immigration legislation was drafted 
at an ALEC conference last year.   
 
ALEC's Bowman says that is not unusual; more than 200 of the 
organization's model bills became actual laws over the past year. 
(“Shaping State Laws”, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Sullivan also adds: 
 
So, for example, last December Arizona state Sen. Russell Pearce sat in a 
hotel conference room with representatives from the Corrections 
Corporation of America and several dozen others. The group voted on 
model legislation that was introduced into the Arizona legislature two 
months later, almost word for word. (“Shaping State Laws”, 2010, p. 3). 
 
According to Sullivan, when Pearce’s bill was introduced in the Arizona 
legislature, “there were signs of ALEC influence” (“Prison Economics”, 2010, p. 4).  
Sullivan confirms that “Thirty-six co-sponsors jumped on, a number almost unheard of in 
the capitol. According to records obtained by NPR, two-thirds of them either went to that 
December meeting or are ALEC members.” (“Prison Economics”, 2010, p. 4).  Sullivan 
then asserts, “Thirty of the 36 co-sponsors received donations over the next six months, 
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from prison lobbyists or prison companies — Corrections Corporation of America, 
Management and Training Corporation and The Geo Group.” (“Prison Economics”, 
2010, p. 4).  She explains that more states are now beginning to introduce or consider 
similar legislation like to that of Arizona’s.  Interestingly, some of those legislators 
involved are ALEC members and/or were at the same conference as Pearce.  Sullivan 
writes: 
A review of the two dozen states now considering Arizona's immigration 
law shows many of those pushing similar legislation across the country are 
ALEC members. 
 
In fact, five of those legislators were in the hotel conference room with the 
Corrections Corporation of America the day the model bill was written. 
The prison company didn't have to file a lobbying report or disclose any 
gifts to legislators. They don't even have to tell anyone they were there. 
All they have to do is pay their ALEC dues and show up. (“Shaping State 
Laws”, 2010, p. 3). 
 
 Thus Black’s theory on the behavior of law in relation to organizations is again 
supported.  Those actions that organizations take offense to will be dealt with swiftly and 
severely by the higher tiered groups through the application of the law.  As Black 
purports, the behaviors considered deviant against an organization are considered the 
greatest offense.  Conversely, an action by an organization against an individual or lower 
tiered group is considered the least offensive.  Black (1989) writes, “A lack of 
organization is one of the greatest disadvantages-possibly the greatest-anyone can 
experience in legal life.  Nevertheless, in modern societies such as the United States, 
most people with legal problems are completely along and unorganized, like bastards in a 
tribe.  This is legal individualism.” (p. 45).  As seen with the Arizona immigration 
legislation, the organizations seem to have the upper hand against the lower tiered groups 
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who lack organization, if having any at all. 
Social Control 
 The last segment of Black’s theory discusses social control.  Black defines this as 
the “normative aspect” of life.  Social control defines the acceptable behavior, and places 
limits around what is defined as deviant behavior.  As Black (1976, 2008) explains, “Law 
varies inversely with other social control.” (p. 107).  As one form of control lessens (e.g., 
family, school, religion, or workplace) law will increase in order to take the place of the 
decreasing social control.  Social control, according to Black, defines what is deviant 
behavior and identifies who is respectable within the community.  Black (1976, 2008) 
explains that, “Law varies directly with respectability.” (p. 112).  The more respectable 
an individual is, the more successful he/she will be at lodging a complaint and getting a 
desired result.  The reverse also holds true— if an unrespectable person lodges a 
complaint, then there is high probability that he/she will not be successful in invoking the 
law or getting a satisfactory result.  Black (1976, 2008) adds, “Even if an unrespectable 
person invokes law against another, he is less likely to succeed.  In this sense, a crime by 
one unrespectable person against another is less serious.” (p. 112).  Black also contends 
that the law is greater when the individual is more respectable. Black (1976, 2008) states, 
“All else constant, then, the less respectable party is more likely to be subject to law, and 
he is less likely to have its benefits.” (p. 114).  With the Arizona immigration legislation, 
one can see similar behavior with the law. 
 Another concern with the Arizona Immigration legislation is the impact 
this bill may have upon immigrant women who are in abusive relationships and allowed 
protection to remain in the United States (although not legally present) under the 
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Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).  This congressional act allows for women who 
may be illegal but married to a U.S. citizen the ability to approach the federal government 
for reprieve and safety from the abusive marriage.  However, the woman must approach 
law enforcement for protection, an issue that becomes complicated with the new Arizona 
immigration legislation because it stipulates that any legal contact requires officers to 
verify the legal status of the individual.  Ashley Arcidiacono (2010), author of the article 
“Silencing the Voices Of Battered Women: How Arizona's New Anti-Immigration Law 
"S.B. 1070" Prevents Undocumented Women from Seeking Relief Under the Violence 
Against Women Act” states that there are, 
…three provisions of S.B. 1070 that negatively impact battered 
undocumented women remain in effect: (1) the provision requiring that 
S.B. 1070 be enforced to the full extent of federal law, (2) the provision 
allowing citizens to sue law enforcement if S.B. 1070 is not enforced to 
the full extent of federal law, and (3) the provision prohibiting the 
transportation and harboring of undocumented aliens.  These provisions 
exacerbate the climate of fear surrounding undocumented battered women 
in Arizona by cloaking anti-immigration sentiment with the power of the 
law. Thus, S.B. 1070 continues to deter these women from utilizing the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) through both anti-immigration 
sentiment and active provisions. (p. 175-76). 
 
 As Arcidiacono explains, undocumented and battered women can seek protection 
from the government by applying for a suspension of deportation if qualifying under 
VAWA.  If the woman qualifies under certain conditions, then she may be able to stay in 
the United States and later apply for citizenship despite being an undocumented resident.  
Arcidiacono (2010) outlines the following qualification for VAWA: 
…a woman must prove the following: (1) she married her abuser in good 
faith; (2) her abuser is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident; (3) she 
resided with him in the United States; (4) during the marriage, either she 
or her child had been battered or subject to extreme cruelty perpetrated by 
the spouse; (5) she is of good moral character; and (6) her deportation 
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would result in extreme hardship to either herself or her children. (181). 
 
Furthermore, a women who is not married to a U.S. citizen is allowed a “U-visa” 
which, according to the VAWA rules, gives women who are unmarried the ability to have 
four years of temporary residency in the United States and the opportunity to apply for 
permanent residency afterwards if she meets the criteria of: 
“(1) ‘substantial physical or mental abuse’; (2) ‘information concerning 
criminal activity’; (3) certification of her helpfulness to ‘Federal, State, or 
local authorities investigating or prosecuting’ the crime; and (4) a crime 
that ‘violated the laws of the United States or occurred in the United 
States.’” (Arcidiacono, 2010, p. 184). 
 
 However, the problem arises that these women will be afraid to come forward 
with legislation like the S.B. 1070 in place in the state of Arizona and even nationwide.  
An issue that women in this category might face is that they find themselves in a “legal 
limbo” due to their circumstances.  If they qualify for protection under VAWA, 
according to Arcidiacono, it can take upwards of a year for the official paperwork to be 
placed into the hands of the woman.  Thus, if a woman is stopped for, say jaywalking, 
and is asked to show identification proving her residency status in the United States, she 
faces the risk of being jailed until such proof can be produced.  For example, § 13-1509 
states, “A.  In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure 
to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 
United States Code Section 1304 (e) or 1306 (a).” (House Engrossed Senate Bill 1070, 
2010, p.4). 
The most important issue that the immigration legislation fails to address is the 
fact that the abusive relationship that the woman desires to leave could create problems 
for providing official documentation.  States Arcidiacono (2010): 
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This requirement is particularly harsh as applied to undocumented battered 
women in Arizona for several reasons.  Foremost, these women do not 
have the necessary identification documents precisely because their 
abusive husbands control their access to the immigration process.  Thus, 
this provision of S.B. 1070 is in direct conflict with VAWA, which does 
not mandate that a woman present any form of identification as part of 
meeting the four criteria for relief mentioned above.  In fact, an 
undocumented battered woman is eligible precisely because she is 
undocumented and without the necessary identification to otherwise help 
herself through the immigration process.  Nonetheless, because these 
women cannot rebut the presumption that they are illegally in the United 
States if they are stopped by law enforcement, this provision of S.B. 1070 
further deters them from leaving an abusive home and seeking relief under 
VAWA. (p. 187-8). 
 
 Thus, a battered woman must first approach law enforcement to seek help.  Next, 
she must wait for official paperwork from the government so that she can have 
documentation of her residency status.  According to Arcidiacono, waiting for such 
documentation can take over a year—a time period which would leave her vulnerable to 
the legislation’s newly criminalized act of not carrying alien registration documents.  
Arcidiacono (2010) writes: 
There are many non-citizens who are present in the United States without 
formal permission who lack the "registration document" mandated by S.B. 
1070, yet would not be removed if placed in federal removal proceedings. 
For example, an individual may be eligible for some form of immigration 
relief, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or withholding of removal. 
Some of these individuals are known to the federal government; others 
will not be identified until they are actually placed in proceedings by the 
federal government and their cases are adjudicated. n98  
 
S.B. 1070's mandate that these women have the required documentation, 
and Arizona's hope to imprison and refer them to federal authorities if they 
do not, are misplaced. This provision significantly increases the likelihood 
that women will not contact police or leave their homes while penalizing 
them for an undocumented status perpetuated by their abusive husbands. 
Consequently, this provision counteracts the efforts of VAWA and 
prevents these women from attempting to seek the relief it offers. (p. 189). 
 
 Noah Pickus and Peter Skerry, authors of “Good Neighbors and Good Citizens: 
64 
Beyond the Legal-Illegal Immigration Debate,” argue that the illegal-legal division line is 
rather blurry but supported in political speech in order to maintain the image of illegal 
immigration.  Pickus and Skerry explain, “Consider the rhetoric across the political 
spectrum.  A liberal columnist depicts illegals as ‘living in the shadow.’  A conservative 
commentator refers to them as a ‘huge, subterranean population’ that exists in fear of one 
day being ‘whisked away by government agents.’” (Swain, 2007, p. 100).  The reality is, 
however, that a good number of these individuals have different statuses within the 
immigration system that are not technically illegal, but not technically documented either.  
Pickus and Skerry emphasize: 
Then there are the 1 million-1.5 million among those 12 million illegals 
who University of Virginia law professor David Martin estimates to be in 
‘twilight status.’ Of these, more than 300,000 have Temporary Protected 
Status (TPS), a category Congress devised in 1990 as a way to avoid either 
repatriating or granting refugee status to individuals from countries (such 
as El Salvador or Nicaragua) beset by civil war and other unsafe 
conditions.  Some Liberians have been here ‘temporarily’ for 14 years.  In 
any event, those afforded TPS are usually counted among the 
undocumented. (Swain, 2007, p. 102). 
 
The authors continue explaining that delays and adjustments can cause other 
documentation problems.  While they are not technically illegal, they still do not have the 
proper documentation needed to satisfy the law.  Pickus and Skerry affirm that “In 
fairness to the bureaucrats, immigration law is a complicated maze of exceptions and 
deadlines cared out by Congress to accommodate diverse constituencies.  These are not 
only difficult to administer; they are hard to comply with and easy to run afoul of.” 
(Swain, 2007, p. 102). 
While it is not an excuse to illegally immigrate into a country, this paper 
demonstrates that the issue is quite complex.  The face value of the law and the real 
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implications can often be two distinct images. Black’s theory is once again supported.  
Social control decreases for a group that has moved or is new to the area.  Those that are 
considered “respectable” or more engrained within the community define what is deviant 
and what is legal.  In turn, those who reside in the lesser-tiered groups are subjected to 
the law without other means for recourse.  Therefore, these low-tiered groups will not 
invoke the law for protection when it is available to them. 
Conclusion 
Black’s theory on the behavior of law is renown for understanding and analyzing 
how social factors can and should be taken into account in order to determine the result of 
a legal interaction.  With the Arizona immigration legislation, S.B 1070, one can see that 
Black’s theory plays out as predicted.  The higher tier relies upon the law to fulfill its 
wishes while the lowest tier is subjected to the law with little or no recourse (except 
involvement from other higher-tiered groups).  By analyzing the various facets of the 
theory, it is demonstrated that those with the most wealth are the most successful with 
legal interactions and in achieving specific ends through the law.  With culture, it is 
ascertained that the lowest-tiered group will suppress its culture in order to blend in and 
be less vulnerable to the law.  Regarding organization, one can see that the corporations 
have taken federal matters into their own hands for lucrative purposes.  And finally, with 
social control, it is shown yet again the lowest-tiered group will be hesitant to seek 








Currently, S. B. 1070 still has an injunction in place against the four most highly 
contentious segments of the legislation.  However, the bill’s enforceability may change as 
the case, United States v. Arizona (2010), makes its way to the Supreme Court.  
Furthermore, the winds of immigration legislation seem to be continuously changing 
direction.   
As discussed before, NPR discovered that many legislators and privatized 
corporations were meeting to formulate new legislation to be taken back to each 
legislator’s home states.  According to Sullivan, 
“A review of the two dozen states now considering Arizona's immigration 
law shows many of those pushing similar legislation across the country are 
ALEC members. In fact, five of those legislators were in the hotel 
conference room with the Corrections Corporation of America the day the 
model bill was written.” (“Shaping State Laws”, 2010, p. 3).   
 
This issue will continue on or die according to how the Arizona case plays out.  
Lacey adds, “The decision will be closely watched in several states that are considering 
similar laws of their own. The Georgia Senate was set to debate the matter on Monday, 
and another bill appeared on the move in Alabama.” (“Appeals Court Rules”, 2011, p. 2). 
This study is designed to answer one main question: How does law behave in 
relation to the Arizona immigration legislation in regard to a Blackian analysis?  Through 
this thesis, it has become apparent that wealth, membership to the mainstream culture, 
high levels of organization, and more social control benefit the individuals that take part 
in creating this legislation.  This thesis has demonstrated when analyzing stratification, 
that those with the highest amount of wealth control the functioning of the law.  Those 
with the least amount of wealth will be subject to the law the most.  With culture, it is 
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ascertained that as the culture moves toward the peak of intermixing, the law will 
intensify.  When this intensification occurs, those that are not part of the “mainstream” 
culture will become subjected to the law more than mainstream members.  The Arizona 
legislation has the potential to impose a chilling effect upon Spanish speakers, since they 
will be considered unconventional because of their speech.  This in turn will lead to more 
law in these individuals’ lives. 
The state has shown through its organization and cooperation with other 
corporations that it will benefit the most from this new immigration legislation.  In the 
meantime, the least organized groups (namely the individuals) will be vulnerable to the 
law.  This law, as NPR has uncovered, was created to make profit for both Arizona and 
the private prison corporations.  The ones that will pay the highest price for this new 
legislation will be the unorganized individuals.  Finally, social control will have its own 
negative effects upon members of the community.  The least “respectable” members of 
society will be left without the protection of the law and will refuse to rely upon the 
system that was designed to protect them.  Finally, those individuals who are not illegal, 
yet lack documentation, will be swept up within the wording of the law. 
Roger M. Smith, author of “Alien Rights, Citizen Rights, and the Politics of 
Restriction,” phrases the complex issues surrounding the plethora of various legal debates 
concerning immigration perfectly.  He writes, “The harsh picture is therefore not the 
whole story.  But it is enough of the story to ensure that eternal vigilance remains the 
price of civil liberties for citizens and noncitizens alike.” (Swain, 2007, p. 126).  This 
thesis only begins to scratch the surface of this evolving and complex problem.  Indeed, 
this topic may even drastically change within the coming years.  However this analysis is 
68 
the start of the vigilance that Smith speaks of.  It is an analysis that warns of the 
“unintended” consequences that this legislation could inflict upon the least protected 
groups in the society.   
Illegal immigration is a problem within the United States; however, this 
legislation is not designed to fix this.  Rather, its design will inflict tremendous harm 
upon many individuals: citizens and non-citizens alike.  This sweeping force of authority 
catches individuals who should be protected and will subject those protected individuals 
to the law in its strictest form.  This thesis is not an answer for the illegal immigration 
issue.  Rather, it is a warning flag designed to protect those vulnerable to the law, those 
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Appendix: S.B. 1070 Immigration Legislation 
 
 - 1 - 
 
On April 23, 2010, Senate Bill 1070 (sponsored by Senator Russell Pearce) was signed 
into law.  SB1070 was enacted as Laws 2010, Chapter 113.  House Bill 2162 made 
additional changes to Laws 2010, Chapter 113.  Below is an engrossed version of 
SB1070 with the pertinent changes made by the Conference Engrossed HB2162.  BLUE 
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Forty-ninth Legislature 










AMENDING TITLE 11, CHAPTER 7, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY 
ADDING ARTICLE 8; AMENDING TITLE 13, CHAPTER 15, ARIZONA REVISED 
STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTION 13-1509; AMENDING SECTION 13-2319, 
ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES; AMENDING TITLE 13, CHAPTER 29, ARIZONA 
REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTIONS 13-2928 AND 13-2929; 
AMENDING SECTIONS 13-3883, 23-212, 23-212.01, 23-214 AND 28-3511, 
ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES; AMENDING TITLE 41, CHAPTER 12, ARTICLE 
2, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTION 41-1724; RELATING 
TO UNLAWFULLY PRESENT ALIENS. 
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona: 1 
Section 1.  Intent 2 
The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the 3 
cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of 4 
Arizona.  The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make 5 
attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local 6 
government agencies in Arizona.  The provisions of this act are intended 7 
to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence 8 
of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the 9 
United States.  10 
Sec. 2.  Title 11, chapter 7, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended 11 
by adding article 8, to read: 12 
ARTICLE 8.  ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS 13 
11-1051.  Cooperation and assistance in enforcement of 14 
immigration laws; indemnification 15 
A.  NO OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR 16 
OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY LIMIT OR RESTRICT THE 17 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS TO LESS THAN THE FULL EXTENT 18 
PERMITTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 19 
B.  FOR ANY LAWFUL CONTACT STOP, DETENTION OR ARREST MADE BY A LAW 20 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A LAW 21 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN 22 
OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANY 23 
OTHER LAW OR ORDINANCE OF A COUNTY, CITY OR TOWN OR THIS STATE WHERE 24 
REASONABLE SUSPICION EXISTS THAT THE PERSON IS AN ALIEN WHO AND IS 25 
UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES, A REASONABLE ATTEMPT SHALL BE 26 
MADE, WHEN PRACTICABLE, TO DETERMINE THE IMMIGRATION STATUS OF THE PERSON, 27 
EXCEPT IF THE DETERMINATION MAY HINDER OR OBSTRUCT AN INVESTIGATION.  ANY 28 
PERSON WHO IS ARRESTED SHALL HAVE THE PERSON'S IMMIGRATION STATUS 29 
DETERMINED BEFORE THE PERSON IS RELEASED.  THE PERSON'S IMMIGRATION STATUS 30 
SHALL BE VERIFIED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES 31 
CODE SECTION 1373(c).  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE 32 
OR A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY 33 
NOT SOLELY CONSIDER RACE, COLOR OR NATIONAL ORIGIN IN IMPLEMENTING THE 34 
REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SUBSECTION EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY THE 35 
UNITED STATES OR ARIZONA CONSTITUTION.  A PERSON IS PRESUMED TO NOT BE AN 36 
ALIEN WHO IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES IF THE PERSON 37 
PROVIDES TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR AGENCY ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: 38 
1.  A VALID ARIZONA DRIVER LICENSE. 39 
2.  A VALID ARIZONA NONOPERATING IDENTIFICATION LICENSE. 40 
3.  A VALID TRIBAL ENROLLMENT CARD OR OTHER FORM OF TRIBAL 41 
IDENTIFICATION. 42 
4.  IF THE ENTITY REQUIRES PROOF OF LEGAL PRESENCE IN THE UNITED 43 
STATES BEFORE ISSUANCE, ANY VALID UNITED STATES FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL 44 
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C.  IF AN ALIEN WHO IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES IS 1 
CONVICTED OF A VIOLATION OF STATE OR LOCAL LAW, ON DISCHARGE FROM 2 
IMPRISONMENT OR ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ANY MONETARY OBLIGATION THAT IS 3 
IMPOSED, THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE 4 
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED. 5 
D.  NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER LAW, A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY MAY 6 
SECURELY TRANSPORT AN ALIEN WHO THE AGENCY HAS RECEIVED VERIFICATION IS 7 
UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHO IS IN THE AGENCY'S CUSTODY 8 
TO A FEDERAL FACILITY IN THIS STATE OR TO ANY OTHER POINT OF TRANSFER INTO 9 
FEDERAL CUSTODY THAT IS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 10 
AGENCY.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SHALL OBTAIN JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION 11 
BEFORE SECURELY TRANSPORTING AN ALIEN WHO IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE 12 
UNITED STATES TO A POINT OF TRANSFER THAT IS OUTSIDE OF THIS STATE. 13 
E.  IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SECTION, AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION 14 
STATUS MAY BE DETERMINED BY: 15 
1.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL 16 
GOVERNMENT TO VERIFY OR ASCERTAIN AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION STATUS. 17 
2.  THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE 18 
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES 19 
CODE SECTION 1373(c). 20 
E.  F.  EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN FEDERAL LAW, OFFICIALS OR AGENCIES OF 21 
THIS STATE AND COUNTIES, CITIES, TOWNS AND OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF 22 
THIS STATE MAY NOT BE PROHIBITED OR IN ANY WAY BE RESTRICTED FROM SENDING, 23 
RECEIVING OR MAINTAINING INFORMATION RELATING TO THE IMMIGRATION STATUS, 24 
LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL, OF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR EXCHANGING THAT INFORMATION WITH 25 
ANY OTHER FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY FOR THE FOLLOWING 26 
OFFICIAL PURPOSES: 27 
1.  DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ANY PUBLIC BENEFIT, SERVICE OR 28 
LICENSE PROVIDED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL OR OTHER POLITICAL 29 
SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE. 30 
2.  VERIFYING ANY CLAIM OF RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE IF DETERMINATION OF 31 
RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE IS REQUIRED UNDER THE LAWS OF THIS STATE OR A 32 
JUDICIAL ORDER ISSUED PURSUANT TO A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IN THIS 33 
STATE. 34 
3.  IF THE PERSON IS AN ALIEN, DETERMINING WHETHER THE PERSON IS IN 35 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL REGISTRATION LAWS PRESCRIBED BY TITLE II, 36 
CHAPTER 7 OF THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. 37 
4.  PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1373 AND 8 UNITED 38 
STATES CODE SECTION 1644. 39 
F.  G.  THIS SECTION DOES NOT IMPLEMENT, AUTHORIZE OR ESTABLISH AND 40 
SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO IMPLEMENT, AUTHORIZE OR ESTABLISH THE REAL ID 41 
ACT OF 2005 (P.L. 109-13, DIVISION B; 119 STAT. 302), INCLUDING THE USE OF 42 
A RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION CHIP. 43 
G.  H.  A PERSON WHO IS A LEGAL RESIDENT OF THIS STATE MAY BRING AN 44 
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OR A COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE THAT 1 
ADOPTS OR IMPLEMENTS A POLICY OR PRACTICE THAT LIMITS OR RESTRICTS THE 2 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS, INCLUDING 8 UNITED STATES CODE 3 
SECTIONS 1373 AND 1644, TO LESS THAN THE FULL EXTENT PERMITTED BY FEDERAL 4 
LAW.  IF THERE IS A JUDICIAL FINDING THAT AN ENTITY HAS VIOLATED THIS 5 
SECTION, THE COURT SHALL ORDER THAT THE ENTITY PAY A CIVIL PENALTY OF NOT 6 
LESS THAN ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NOT MORE THAN FIVE 7 
THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR EACH DAY THAT THE POLICY HAS REMAINED IN EFFECT AFTER 8 
THE FILING OF AN ACTION PURSUANT TO THIS SUBSECTION. 9 
H.  I.  A COURT SHALL COLLECT THE CIVIL PENALTY PRESCRIBED IN 10 
SUBSECTION G  H OF THIS SECTION AND REMIT THE CIVIL PENALTY TO THE STATE 11 
TREASURER FOR DEPOSIT IN THE GANG AND IMMIGRATION INTELLIGENCE TEAM 12 
ENFORCEMENT MISSION FUND ESTABLISHED BY SECTION 41-1724. 13 
I.  J.  THE COURT MAY AWARD COURT COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 14 
TO ANY PERSON OR ANY OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, CITY, 15 
TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE THAT PREVAILS BY AN 16 
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS IN A PROCEEDING BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS 17 
SECTION. 18 
J.  K.  EXCEPT IN RELATION TO MATTERS IN WHICH THE OFFICER IS 19 
ADJUDGED TO HAVE ACTED IN BAD FAITH, A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IS 20 
INDEMNIFIED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S AGENCY AGAINST REASONABLE 21 
COSTS AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES, INCURRED BY THE OFFICER IN 22 
CONNECTION WITH ANY ACTION, SUIT OR PROCEEDING BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THIS 23 
SECTION IN WHICH THE OFFICER MAY BE A DEFENDANT BY REASON OF THE OFFICER 24 
BEING OR HAVING BEEN A MEMBER OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY. 25 
K.  L.  THIS SECTION SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT 26 
WITH FEDERAL LAWS REGULATING IMMIGRATION, PROTECTING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 27 
ALL PERSONS AND RESPECTING THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF UNITED STATES 28 
CITIZENS.  29 
Sec. 3.  Title 13, chapter 15, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended 30 
by adding section 13-1509, to read: 31 
13-1509.  Willful failure to complete or carry an alien 32 
registration document; assessment; exception; 33 
authenticated records; classification 34 
A.  IN ADDITION TO ANY VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW, A PERSON IS GUILTY 35 
OF WILLFUL FAILURE TO COMPLETE OR CARRY AN ALIEN REGISTRATION DOCUMENT IF 36 
THE PERSON IS IN VIOLATION OF 8 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1304(e) OR 37 
1306(a). 38 
B.  IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION, AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION 39 
STATUS MAY BE DETERMINED BY: 40 
1.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL 41 
GOVERNMENT TO VERIFY OR ASCERTAIN AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION STATUS. 42 
2.  THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE 43 
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES 44 
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C.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, 1 
CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY NOT CONSIDER 2 
RACE, COLOR OR NATIONAL ORIGIN IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION EXCEPT 3 
TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ARIZONA CONSTITUTION. 4 
C.  D.  A PERSON WHO IS SENTENCED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION IS NOT 5 
ELIGIBLE FOR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE, PROBATION, PARDON, COMMUTATION OF 6 
SENTENCE, OR RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT ON ANY BASIS EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY 7 
SECTION 31-233, SUBSECTION A OR B UNTIL THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT 8 
HAS BEEN SERVED OR THE PERSON IS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE PURSUANT TO SECTION 9 
41-1604.07. 10 
D.  E.  IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER PENALTY PRESCRIBED BY LAW, THE 11 
COURT SHALL ORDER THE PERSON TO PAY JAIL COSTS. AND AN ADDITIONAL 12 
ASSESSMENT IN THE FOLLOWING AMOUNTS: 13 
1.  AT LEAST FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR A FIRST VIOLATION. 14 
2.  TWICE THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS SUBSECTION IF 15 
THE PERSON WAS PREVIOUSLY SUBJECT TO AN ASSESSMENT PURSUANT TO THIS 16 
SUBSECTION. 17 
E.  A COURT SHALL COLLECT THE ASSESSMENTS PRESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION D 18 
OF THIS SECTION AND REMIT THE ASSESSMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 19 
SAFETY, WHICH SHALL ESTABLISH A SPECIAL SUBACCOUNT FOR THE MONIES IN THE 20 
ACCOUNT ESTABLISHED FOR THE GANG AND IMMIGRATION INTELLIGENCE TEAM 21 
ENFORCEMENT MISSION APPROPRIATION.  MONIES IN THE SPECIAL SUBACCOUNT ARE 22 
SUBJECT TO LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION FOR DISTRIBUTION FOR GANG AND 23 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND FOR COUNTY JAIL REIMBURSEMENT COSTS RELATING 24 
TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION. 25 
F.  THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A PERSON WHO MAINTAINS 26 
AUTHORIZATION FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO REMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. 27 
G.  ANY RECORD THAT RELATES TO THE IMMIGRATION STATUS OF A PERSON IS 28 
ADMISSIBLE IN ANY COURT WITHOUT FURTHER FOUNDATION OR TESTIMONY FROM A 29 
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS IF THE RECORD IS CERTIFIED AS AUTHENTIC BY THE 30 
GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE RECORD. 31 
H.  A VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION IS A CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR, EXCEPT 32 
THAT THE MAXIMUM FINE IS ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND FOR A FIRST VIOLATION OF 33 
THIS SECTION IS: THE COURT SHALL NOT SENTENCE THE PERSON TO MORE THAN 34 
TWENTY DAYS IN JAIL AND FOR A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION THE COURT 35 
SHALL NOT SENTENCE THE PERSON TO MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS IN JAIL. 36 
1.  A CLASS 3 FELONY IF THE PERSON VIOLATES THIS SECTION WHILE IN 37 
POSSESSION OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: 38 
(a)  A DANGEROUS DRUG AS DEFINED IN SECTION 13-3401. 39 
(b)  PRECURSOR CHEMICALS THAT ARE USED IN THE MANUFACTURING OF 40 
METHAMPHETAMINE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 13-3404.01. 41 
(c)  A DEADLY WEAPON OR A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT, AS DEFINED IN 42 
SECTION 13-105. 43 
(d)  PROPERTY THAT IS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMMITTING AN ACT OF 44 
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2.  A CLASS 4 FELONY IF THE PERSON EITHER: 1 
(a)  IS CONVICTED OF A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF THIS 2 
SECTION.  3 
(b)  WITHIN SIXTY MONTHS BEFORE THE VIOLATION, HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM 4 
THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1229a OR HAS 5 
ACCEPTED A VOLUNTARY REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED 6 
STATES CODE SECTION 1229c.  7 
Sec. 4.  Section 13-2319, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to 8 
read: 9 
13-2319.  Smuggling; classification; definitions 10 
A.  It is unlawful for a person to intentionally engage in the 11 
smuggling of human beings for profit or commercial purpose. 12 
B.  A violation of this section is a class 4 felony. 13 
C.  Notwithstanding subsection B of this section, a violation of 14 
this section: 15 
1.  Is a class 2 felony if the human being who is smuggled is under 16 
eighteen years of age and is not accompanied by a family member over 17 
eighteen years of age or the offense involved the use of a deadly weapon 18 
or dangerous instrument. 19 
2.  Is a class 3 felony if the offense involves the use or 20 
threatened use of deadly physical force and the person is not eligible for 21 
suspension of sentence, probation, pardon or release from confinement on 22 
any other basis except pursuant to section 31-233, subsection A or B until 23 
the sentence imposed by the court is served, the person is eligible for 24 
release pursuant to section 41-1604.07 or the sentence is commuted. 25 
D.  Chapter 10 of this title does not apply to a violation of 26 
subsection C, paragraph 1 of this section. 27 
E.  NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER LAW, IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS 28 
SECTION A PEACE OFFICER MAY LAWFULLY STOP ANY PERSON WHO IS OPERATING A 29 
MOTOR VEHICLE IF THE OFFICER HAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THE 30 
PERSON IS IN VIOLATION OF ANY CIVIL TRAFFIC LAW. 31 
E.  F.  For the purposes of this section: 32 
1.  "Family member" means the person's parent, grandparent, sibling 33 
or any other person who is related to the person by consanguinity or 34 
affinity to the second degree. 35 
2.  "Procurement of transportation" means any participation in or 36 
facilitation of transportation and includes: 37 
(a)  Providing services that facilitate transportation including 38 
travel arrangement services or money transmission services. 39 
(b)  Providing property that facilitates transportation, including a 40 
weapon, a vehicle or other means of transportation or false 41 
identification, or selling, leasing, renting or otherwise making available 42 
a drop house as defined in section 13-2322. 43 
3.  "Smuggling of human beings" means the transportation, 44 
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person or an entity that knows or has reason to know that the person or 1 
persons transported or to be transported are not United States citizens, 2 
permanent resident aliens or persons otherwise lawfully in this state or 3 
have attempted to enter, entered or remained in the United States in 4 
violation of law.  5 
Sec. 5.  Title 13, chapter 29, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended 6 
by adding sections 13-2928 and 13-2929, to read: 7 
13-2928.  Unlawful stopping to hire and pick up passengers for 8 
work; unlawful application, solicitation or 9 
employment; classification; definitions 10 
A.  IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR AN OCCUPANT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS 11 
STOPPED ON A STREET, ROADWAY OR HIGHWAY TO ATTEMPT TO HIRE OR HIRE AND 12 
PICK UP PASSENGERS FOR WORK AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION IF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 13 
BLOCKS OR IMPEDES THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC. 14 
B.  IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON TO ENTER A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS 15 
STOPPED ON A STREET, ROADWAY OR HIGHWAY IN ORDER TO BE HIRED BY AN 16 
OCCUPANT OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE AND TO BE TRANSPORTED TO WORK AT A DIFFERENT 17 
LOCATION IF THE MOTOR VEHICLE BLOCKS OR IMPEDES THE NORMAL MOVEMENT OF 18 
TRAFFIC. 19 
C.  IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON WHO IS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE 20 
UNITED STATES AND WHO IS AN UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN TO KNOWINGLY APPLY FOR 21 
WORK, SOLICIT WORK IN A PUBLIC PLACE OR PERFORM WORK AS AN EMPLOYEE OR 22 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN THIS STATE. 23 
D.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, 24 
CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY NOT CONSIDER 25 
RACE, COLOR OR NATIONAL ORIGIN IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION EXCEPT 26 
TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ARIZONA CONSTITUTION. 27 
E.  IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION, AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION 28 
STATUS MAY BE DETERMINED BY: 29 
1.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL 30 
GOVERNMENT TO VERIFY OR ASCERTAIN AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION STATUS. 31 
2.  THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE 32 
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES 33 
CODE SECTION 1373(c). 34 
D.  F.  A VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION IS A CLASS 1 MISDEMEANOR. 35 
E.  G.  FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION: 36 
1.  "SOLICIT" MEANS VERBAL OR NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION BY A GESTURE 37 
OR A NOD THAT WOULD INDICATE TO A REASONABLE PERSON THAT A PERSON IS 38 
WILLING TO BE EMPLOYED.  39 
2.  "UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN" MEANS AN ALIEN WHO DOES NOT HAVE THE LEGAL 40 
RIGHT OR AUTHORIZATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW TO WORK IN THE UNITED STATES AS 41 
DESCRIBED IN 8 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1324a(h)(3).  42 
13-2929.  Unlawful transporting, moving, concealing, harboring 43 
or shielding of unlawful aliens; vehicle 44 
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A.  IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON WHO IS IN VIOLATION OF A CRIMINAL 1 
OFFENSE TO: 2 
1.  TRANSPORT OR MOVE OR ATTEMPT TO TRANSPORT OR MOVE AN ALIEN IN 3 
THIS STATE, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE ILLEGAL PRESENCE OF THE ALIEN IN THE 4 
UNITED STATES, IN A MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IF THE PERSON KNOWS OR 5 
RECKLESSLY DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT THE ALIEN HAS COME TO, HAS ENTERED OR 6 
REMAINS IN THE UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF LAW. 7 
2.  CONCEAL, HARBOR OR SHIELD OR ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL, HARBOR OR 8 
SHIELD AN ALIEN FROM DETECTION IN ANY PLACE IN THIS STATE, INCLUDING ANY 9 
BUILDING OR ANY MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION, IF THE PERSON KNOWS OR RECKLESSLY 10 
DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT THE ALIEN HAS COME TO, HAS ENTERED OR REMAINS IN 11 
THE UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF LAW. 12 
3.  ENCOURAGE OR INDUCE AN ALIEN TO COME TO OR RESIDE IN THIS STATE 13 
IF THE PERSON KNOWS OR RECKLESSLY DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT SUCH COMING TO, 14 
ENTERING OR RESIDING IN THIS STATE IS OR WILL BE IN VIOLATION OF LAW. 15 
B.  A MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION THAT IS USED IN THE COMMISSION OF A 16 
VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION IS SUBJECT TO MANDATORY VEHICLE IMMOBILIZATION 17 
OR IMPOUNDMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 28-3511. 18 
C.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL OR AGENCY OF THIS STATE OR A COUNTY, 19 
CITY, TOWN OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THIS STATE MAY NOT CONSIDER 20 
RACE, COLOR OR NATIONAL ORIGIN IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION EXCEPT 21 
TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ARIZONA CONSTITUTION. 22 
D.  IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION, AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION 23 
STATUS MAY BE DETERMINED BY: 24 
1.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL 25 
GOVERNMENT TO VERIFY OR ASCERTAIN AN ALIEN'S IMMIGRATION STATUS. 26 
2.  THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OR THE 27 
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PURSUANT TO 8 UNITED STATES 28 
CODE SECTION 1373(c). 29 
C.  E.  THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 30 
WORKER ACTING IN THE WORKER'S OFFICIAL CAPACITY OR A PERSON WHO IS ACTING 31 
IN THE CAPACITY OF A FIRST RESPONDER, AN AMBULANCE ATTENDANT OR AN 32 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN AND WHO IS TRANSPORTING OR MOVING AN ALIEN IN 33 
THIS STATE PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 21.1. 34 
D.  F.  A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THIS SECTION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS 1 35 
MISDEMEANOR AND IS SUBJECT TO A FINE OF AT LEAST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, 36 
EXCEPT THAT A VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION THAT INVOLVES TEN OR MORE ILLEGAL 37 
ALIENS IS A CLASS 6 FELONY AND THE PERSON IS SUBJECT TO A FINE OF AT LEAST 38 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR EACH ALIEN WHO IS INVOLVED.  39 
Sec. 6.  Section 13-3883, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to 40 
read: 41 
13-3883.  Arrest by officer without warrant 42 
A.  A peace officer may, without a warrant, MAY arrest a person if 43 
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1.  A felony has been committed and probable cause to believe the 1 
person to be arrested has committed the felony. 2 
2.  A misdemeanor has been committed in his THE OFFICER'S presence 3 
and probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the 4 
offense. 5 
3.  The person to be arrested has been involved in a traffic 6 
accident and violated any criminal section of title 28, and that such 7 
violation occurred prior to or immediately following such traffic 8 
accident. 9 
4.  A misdemeanor or a petty offense has been committed and probable 10 
cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the offense.  A 11 
person arrested under this paragraph is eligible for release under section 12 
13-3903. 13 
5.  THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED ANY PUBLIC OFFENSE THAT 14 
MAKES THE PERSON REMOVABLE FROM THE UNITED STATES. 15 
B.  A peace officer may stop and detain a person as is reasonably 16 
necessary to investigate an actual or suspected violation of any traffic 17 
law committed in the officer's presence and may serve a copy of the 18 
traffic complaint for any alleged civil or criminal traffic violation.  A 19 
peace officer who serves a copy of the traffic complaint shall do so 20 
within a reasonable time of the alleged criminal or civil traffic 21 
violation.  22 
Sec. 7.  Section 23-212, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to 23 
read: 24 
23-212.  Knowingly employing unauthorized aliens; prohibition; 25 
false and frivolous complaints; violation; 26 
classification; license suspension and revocation; 27 
affirmative defense 28 
A.  An employer shall not knowingly employ an unauthorized alien.  29 
If, in the case when an employer uses a contract, subcontract or other 30 
independent contractor agreement to obtain the labor of an alien in this 31 
state, the employer knowingly contracts with an unauthorized alien or with 32 
a person who employs or contracts with an unauthorized alien to perform 33 
the labor, the employer violates this subsection. 34 
B.  The attorney general shall prescribe a complaint form for a 35 
person to allege a violation of subsection A of this section.  The 36 
complainant shall not be required to list the complainant's social 37 
security number on the complaint form or to have the complaint form 38 
notarized.  On receipt of a complaint on a prescribed complaint form that 39 
an employer allegedly knowingly employs an unauthorized alien, the 40 
attorney general or county attorney shall investigate whether the employer 41 
has violated subsection A of this section.  If a complaint is received but 42 
is not submitted on a prescribed complaint form, the attorney general or 43 
county attorney may investigate whether the employer has violated 44 
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prohibit the filing of anonymous complaints that are not submitted on a 1 
prescribed complaint form.  The attorney general or county attorney shall 2 
not investigate complaints that are based solely on race, color or 3 
national origin.  A complaint that is submitted to a county attorney shall 4 
be submitted to the county attorney in the county in which the alleged 5 
unauthorized alien is or was employed by the employer.  The county sheriff 6 
or any other local law enforcement agency may assist in investigating a 7 
complaint.  When investigating a complaint, the attorney general or county 8 
attorney shall verify the work authorization of the alleged unauthorized 9 
alien with the federal government pursuant to 8 United States Code section 10 
1373(c).  A state, county or local official shall not attempt to 11 
independently make a final determination on whether an alien is authorized 12 
to work in the United States.  An alien's immigration status or work 13 
authorization status shall be verified with the federal government 14 
pursuant to 8 United States Code section 1373(c).  A person who knowingly 15 
files a false and frivolous complaint under this subsection is guilty of a 16 
class 3 misdemeanor. 17 
C.  If, after an investigation, the attorney general or county 18 
attorney determines that the complaint is not false and frivolous: 19 
1.  The attorney general or county attorney shall notify the United 20 
States immigration and customs enforcement of the unauthorized alien. 21 
2.  The attorney general or county attorney shall notify the local 22 
law enforcement agency of the unauthorized alien. 23 
3.  The attorney general shall notify the appropriate county 24 
attorney to bring an action pursuant to subsection D of this section if 25 
the complaint was originally filed with the attorney general. 26 
D.  An action for a violation of subsection A of this section shall 27 
be brought against the employer by the county attorney in the county where 28 
the unauthorized alien employee is or was employed by the employer.  The 29 
county attorney shall not bring an action against any employer for any 30 
violation of subsection A of this section that occurs before January 1, 31 
2008.  A second violation of this section shall be based only on an 32 
unauthorized alien who is or was employed by the employer after an action 33 
has been brought for a violation of subsection A of this section or 34 
section 23-212.01, subsection A. 35 
E.  For any action in superior court under this section, the court 36 
shall expedite the action, including assigning the hearing at the earliest 37 
practicable date. 38 
F.  On a finding of a violation of subsection A of this section: 39 
1.  For a first violation, as described in paragraph 3 of this 40 
subsection, the court: 41 
(a)  Shall order the employer to terminate the employment of all 42 
unauthorized aliens. 43 
(b)  Shall order the employer to be subject to a three year 44 
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performed work.  During the probationary period the employer shall file 1 
quarterly reports in the form provided in section 23-722.01 with the 2 
county attorney of each new employee who is hired by the employer at the 3 
business location where the unauthorized alien performed work. 4 
(c)  Shall order the employer to file a signed sworn affidavit with 5 
the county attorney within three business days after the order is 6 
issued.  The affidavit shall state that the employer has terminated the 7 
employment of all unauthorized aliens in this state and that the employer 8 
will not intentionally or knowingly employ an unauthorized alien in this 9 
state.  The court shall order the appropriate agencies to suspend all 10 
licenses subject to this subdivision that are held by the employer if the 11 
employer fails to file a signed sworn affidavit with the county attorney 12 
within three business days after the order is issued.  All licenses that 13 
are suspended under this subdivision shall remain suspended until the 14 
employer files a signed sworn affidavit with the county attorney.  15 
Notwithstanding any other law, on filing of the affidavit the suspended 16 
licenses shall be reinstated immediately by the appropriate agencies.  For 17 
the purposes of this subdivision, the licenses that are subject to 18 
suspension under this subdivision are all licenses that are held by the 19 
employer specific to the business location where the unauthorized alien 20 
performed work.  If the employer does not hold a license specific to the 21 
business location where the unauthorized alien performed work, but a 22 
license is necessary to operate the employer's business in general, the 23 
licenses that are subject to suspension under this subdivision are all 24 
licenses that are held by the employer at the employer's primary place of 25 
business.  On receipt of the court's order and notwithstanding any other 26 
law, the appropriate agencies shall suspend the licenses according to the 27 
court's order.  The court shall send a copy of the court's order to the 28 
attorney general and the attorney general shall maintain the copy pursuant 29 
to subsection G of this section. 30 
(d)  May order the appropriate agencies to suspend all licenses 31 
described in subdivision (c) of this paragraph that are held by the 32 
employer for not to exceed ten business days.  The court shall base its 33 
decision to suspend under this subdivision on any evidence or information 34 
submitted to it during the action for a violation of this subsection and 35 
shall consider the following factors, if relevant: 36 
(i)  The number of unauthorized aliens employed by the employer. 37 
(ii)  Any prior misconduct by the employer. 38 
(iii)  The degree of harm resulting from the violation. 39 
(iv)  Whether the employer made good faith efforts to comply with 40 
any applicable requirements. 41 
(v)  The duration of the violation. 42 
(vi)  The role of the directors, officers or principals of the 43 
employer in the violation. 44 
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2.  For a second violation, as described in paragraph 3 of this 1 
subsection, the court shall order the appropriate agencies to permanently 2 
revoke all licenses that are held by the employer specific to the business 3 
location where the unauthorized alien performed work.  If the employer 4 
does not hold a license specific to the business location where the 5 
unauthorized alien performed work, but a license is necessary to operate 6 
the employer's business in general, the court shall order the appropriate 7 
agencies to permanently revoke all licenses that are held by the employer 8 
at the employer's primary place of business.  On receipt of the order and 9 
notwithstanding any other law, the appropriate agencies shall immediately 10 
revoke the licenses. 11 
3.  The violation shall be considered: 12 
(a)  A first violation by an employer at a business location if the 13 
violation did not occur during a probationary period ordered by the court 14 
under this subsection or section 23-212.01, subsection F for that 15 
employer's business location. 16 
(b)  A second violation by an employer at a business location if the 17 
violation occurred during a probationary period ordered by the court under 18 
this subsection or section 23-212.01, subsection F for that employer's 19 
business location. 20 
G.  The attorney general shall maintain copies of court orders that 21 
are received pursuant to subsection F of this section and shall maintain a 22 
database of the employers and business locations that have a first 23 
violation of subsection A of this section and make the court orders 24 
available on the attorney general's website. 25 
H.  On determining whether an employee is an unauthorized alien, the 26 
court shall consider only the federal government's determination pursuant 27 
to 8 United States Code section 1373(c). The federal government's 28 
determination creates a rebuttable presumption of the employee's lawful 29 
status.  The court may take judicial notice of the federal government's 30 
determination and may request the federal government to provide automated 31 
or testimonial verification pursuant to 8 United States Code section 32 
1373(c). 33 
I.  For the purposes of this section, proof of verifying the 34 
employment authorization of an employee through the e-verify program 35 
creates a rebuttable presumption that an employer did not knowingly employ 36 
an unauthorized alien. 37 
J.  For the purposes of this section, an employer that establishes 38 
that it has complied in good faith with the requirements of 8 United 39 
States Code section 1324a(b) establishes an affirmative defense that the 40 
employer did not knowingly employ an unauthorized alien.  An employer is 41 
considered to have complied with the requirements of 8 United States Code 42 
section 1324a(b), notwithstanding an isolated, sporadic or accidental 43 
technical or procedural failure to meet the requirements, if there is a 44 
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K.  IT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO A VIOLATION OF SUBSECTION A OF 1 
THIS SECTION THAT THE EMPLOYER WAS ENTRAPPED.  TO CLAIM ENTRAPMENT, THE 2 
EMPLOYER MUST ADMIT BY THE EMPLOYER'S TESTIMONY OR OTHER EVIDENCE THE 3 
SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE VIOLATION.  AN EMPLOYER WHO ASSERTS AN 4 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FOLLOWING BY A 5 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE: 6 
1.  THE IDEA OF COMMITTING THE VIOLATION STARTED WITH LAW 7 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS RATHER THAN WITH THE EMPLOYER. 8 
2.  THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS URGED AND INDUCED 9 
THE EMPLOYER TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION. 10 
3.  THE EMPLOYER WAS NOT PREDISPOSED TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION BEFORE 11 
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS URGED AND INDUCED THE 12 
EMPLOYER TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION. 13 
L.  AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT ESTABLISH ENTRAPMENT IF THE EMPLOYER WAS 14 
PREDISPOSED TO VIOLATE SUBSECTION A OF THIS SECTION AND THE LAW 15 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS MERELY PROVIDED THE EMPLOYER WITH AN 16 
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION. IT IS NOT ENTRAPMENT FOR LAW 17 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS MERELY TO USE A RUSE OR TO CONCEAL 18 
THEIR IDENTITY.  THE CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND THEIR AGENTS 19 
MAY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING IF AN EMPLOYER HAS PROVEN ENTRAPMENT.  20 
Sec. 8.  Section 23-212.01, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to 21 
read: 22 
23-212.01.  Intentionally employing unauthorized aliens; 23 
prohibition; false and frivolous complaints; 24 
violation; classification; license suspension 25 
and revocation; affirmative defense 26 
A.  An employer shall not intentionally employ an unauthorized 27 
alien.  If, in the case when an employer uses a contract, subcontract or 28 
other independent contractor agreement to obtain the labor of an alien in 29 
this state, the employer intentionally contracts with an unauthorized 30 
alien or with a person who employs or contracts with an unauthorized alien 31 
to perform the labor, the employer violates this subsection. 32 
B.  The attorney general shall prescribe a complaint form for a 33 
person to allege a violation of subsection A of this section.  The 34 
complainant shall not be required to list the complainant's social 35 
security number on the complaint form or to have the complaint form 36 
notarized.  On receipt of a complaint on a prescribed complaint form that 37 
an employer allegedly intentionally employs an unauthorized alien, the 38 
attorney general or county attorney shall investigate whether the employer 39 
has violated subsection A of this section.  If a complaint is received but 40 
is not submitted on a prescribed complaint form, the attorney general or 41 
county attorney may investigate whether the employer has violated 42 
subsection A of this section.  This subsection shall not be construed to 43 
prohibit the filing of anonymous complaints that are not submitted on a 44 
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not investigate complaints that are based solely on race, color or 1 
national origin.  A complaint that is submitted to a county attorney shall 2 
be submitted to the county attorney in the county in which the alleged 3 
unauthorized alien is or was employed by the employer.  The county sheriff 4 
or any other local law enforcement agency may assist in investigating a 5 
complaint.  When investigating a complaint, the attorney general or county 6 
attorney shall verify the work authorization of the alleged unauthorized 7 
alien with the federal government pursuant to 8 United States Code section 8 
1373(c).  A state, county or local official shall not attempt to 9 
independently make a final determination on whether an alien is authorized 10 
to work in the United States.  An alien's immigration status or work 11 
authorization status shall be verified with the federal government 12 
pursuant to 8 United States Code section 1373(c).  A person who knowingly 13 
files a false and frivolous complaint under this subsection is guilty of a 14 
class 3 misdemeanor. 15 
C.  If, after an investigation, the attorney general or county 16 
attorney determines that the complaint is not false and frivolous: 17 
1.  The attorney general or county attorney shall notify the United 18 
States immigration and customs enforcement of the unauthorized alien. 19 
2.  The attorney general or county attorney shall notify the local 20 
law enforcement agency of the unauthorized alien. 21 
3.  The attorney general shall notify the appropriate county 22 
attorney to bring an action pursuant to subsection D of this section if 23 
the complaint was originally filed with the attorney general. 24 
D.  An action for a violation of subsection A of this section shall 25 
be brought against the employer by the county attorney in the county where 26 
the unauthorized alien employee is or was employed by the employer.  The 27 
county attorney shall not bring an action against any employer for any 28 
violation of subsection A of this section that occurs before January 1, 29 
2008. A second violation of this section shall be based only on an 30 
unauthorized alien who is or was employed by the employer after an action 31 
has been brought for a violation of subsection A of this section or 32 
section 23-212, subsection A. 33 
E.  For any action in superior court under this section, the court 34 
shall expedite the action, including assigning the hearing at the earliest 35 
practicable date. 36 
F.  On a finding of a violation of subsection A of this section: 37 
1.  For a first violation, as described in paragraph 3 of this 38 
subsection, the court shall: 39 
(a)  Order the employer to terminate the employment of all 40 
unauthorized aliens. 41 
(b)  Order the employer to be subject to a five year probationary 42 
period for the business location where the unauthorized alien performed 43 
work. During the probationary period the employer shall file quarterly 44 
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of each new employee who is hired by the employer at the business location 1 
where the unauthorized alien performed work. 2 
(c)  Order the appropriate agencies to suspend all licenses 3 
described in subdivision (d) of this paragraph that are held by the 4 
employer for a minimum of ten days.  The court shall base its decision on 5 
the length of the suspension under this subdivision on any evidence or 6 
information submitted to it during the action for a violation of this 7 
subsection and shall consider the following factors, if relevant: 8 
(i)  The number of unauthorized aliens employed by the employer. 9 
(ii)  Any prior misconduct by the employer. 10 
(iii)  The degree of harm resulting from the violation. 11 
(iv)  Whether the employer made good faith efforts to comply with 12 
any applicable requirements. 13 
(v)  The duration of the violation. 14 
(vi)  The role of the directors, officers or principals of the 15 
employer in the violation. 16 
(vii)  Any other factors the court deems appropriate. 17 
(d)  Order the employer to file a signed sworn affidavit with the 18 
county attorney.  The affidavit shall state that the employer has 19 
terminated the employment of all unauthorized aliens in this state and 20 
that the employer will not intentionally or knowingly employ an 21 
unauthorized alien in this state.  The court shall order the appropriate 22 
agencies to suspend all licenses subject to this subdivision that are held 23 
by the employer if the employer fails to file a signed sworn affidavit 24 
with the county attorney within three business days after the order is 25 
issued.  All licenses that are suspended under this subdivision for 26 
failing to file a signed sworn affidavit shall remain suspended until the 27 
employer files a signed sworn affidavit with the county attorney.  For the 28 
purposes of this subdivision, the licenses that are subject to suspension 29 
under this subdivision are all licenses that are held by the employer 30 
specific to the business location where the unauthorized alien performed 31 
work.  If the employer does not hold a license specific to the business 32 
location where the unauthorized alien performed work, but a license is 33 
necessary to operate the employer's business in general, the licenses that 34 
are subject to suspension under this subdivision are all licenses that are 35 
held by the employer at the employer's primary place of business.  On 36 
receipt of the court's order and notwithstanding any other law, the 37 
appropriate agencies shall suspend the licenses according to the court's 38 
order.  The court shall send a copy of the court's order to the attorney 39 
general and the attorney general shall maintain the copy pursuant to 40 
subsection G of this section. 41 
2.  For a second violation, as described in paragraph 3 of this 42 
subsection, the court shall order the appropriate agencies to permanently 43 
revoke all licenses that are held by the employer specific to the business 44 
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does not hold a license specific to the business location where the 1 
unauthorized alien performed work, but a license is necessary to operate 2 
the employer's business in general, the court shall order the appropriate 3 
agencies to permanently revoke all licenses that are held by the employer 4 
at the employer's primary place of business.  On receipt of the order and 5 
notwithstanding any other law, the appropriate agencies shall immediately 6 
revoke the licenses. 7 
3.  The violation shall be considered: 8 
(a)  A first violation by an employer at a business location if the 9 
violation did not occur during a probationary period ordered by the court 10 
under this subsection or section 23-212, subsection F for that employer's 11 
business location. 12 
(b)  A second violation by an employer at a business location if the 13 
violation occurred during a probationary period ordered by the court under 14 
this subsection or section 23-212, subsection F for that employer's 15 
business location. 16 
G.  The attorney general shall maintain copies of court orders that 17 
are received pursuant to subsection F of this section and shall maintain a 18 
database of the employers and business locations that have a first 19 
violation of subsection A of this section and make the court orders 20 
available on the attorney general's website. 21 
H.  On determining whether an employee is an unauthorized alien, the 22 
court shall consider only the federal government's determination pursuant 23 
to 8 United States Code section 1373(c).  The federal government's 24 
determination creates a rebuttable presumption of the employee's lawful 25 
status.  The court may take judicial notice of the federal government's 26 
determination and may request the federal government to provide automated 27 
or testimonial verification pursuant to 8 United States Code section 28 
1373(c). 29 
I.  For the purposes of this section, proof of verifying the 30 
employment authorization of an employee through the e-verify program 31 
creates a rebuttable presumption that an employer did not intentionally 32 
employ an unauthorized alien. 33 
J.  For the purposes of this section, an employer that establishes 34 
that it has complied in good faith with the requirements of 8 United 35 
States Code section 1324a(b) establishes an affirmative defense that the 36 
employer did not intentionally employ an unauthorized alien.  An employer 37 
is considered to have complied with the requirements of 8 United States 38 
Code section 1324a(b), notwithstanding an isolated, sporadic or accidental 39 
technical or procedural failure to meet the requirements, if there is a 40 
good faith attempt to comply with the requirements.  41 
K.  IT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO A VIOLATION OF SUBSECTION A OF 42 
THIS SECTION THAT THE EMPLOYER WAS ENTRAPPED.  TO CLAIM ENTRAPMENT, THE 43 
EMPLOYER MUST ADMIT BY THE EMPLOYER'S TESTIMONY OR OTHER EVIDENCE THE 44 
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ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FOLLOWING BY A 1 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE: 2 
1.  THE IDEA OF COMMITTING THE VIOLATION STARTED WITH LAW 3 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS RATHER THAN WITH THE EMPLOYER. 4 
2.  THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS URGED AND INDUCED 5 
THE EMPLOYER TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION. 6 
3.  THE EMPLOYER WAS NOT PREDISPOSED TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION BEFORE 7 
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS URGED AND INDUCED THE 8 
EMPLOYER TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION. 9 
L.  AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT ESTABLISH ENTRAPMENT IF THE EMPLOYER WAS 10 
PREDISPOSED TO VIOLATE SUBSECTION A OF THIS SECTION AND THE LAW 11 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS MERELY PROVIDED THE EMPLOYER WITH AN 12 
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE VIOLATION. IT IS NOT ENTRAPMENT FOR LAW 13 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENTS MERELY TO USE A RUSE OR TO CONCEAL 14 
THEIR IDENTITY.  THE CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND THEIR AGENTS 15 
MAY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING IF AN EMPLOYER HAS PROVEN ENTRAPMENT.  16 
Sec. 9.  Section 23-214, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to 17 
read: 18 
23-214.  Verification of employment eligibility; e-verify 19 
program; economic development incentives; list of 20 
registered employers 21 
A.  After December 31, 2007, every employer, after hiring an 22 
employee, shall verify the employment eligibility of the employee through 23 
the e-verify program AND SHALL KEEP A RECORD OF THE VERIFICATION FOR THE 24 
DURATION OF THE EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOYMENT OR AT LEAST THREE YEARS, WHICHEVER 25 
IS LONGER. 26 
B.  In addition to any other requirement for an employer to receive 27 
an economic development incentive from a government entity, the employer 28 
shall register with and participate in the e-verify program.  Before 29 
receiving the economic development incentive, the employer shall provide 30 
proof to the government entity that the employer is registered with and is 31 
participating in the e-verify program.  If the government entity 32 
determines that the employer is not complying with this subsection, the 33 
government entity shall notify the employer by certified mail of the 34 
government entity's determination of noncompliance and the employer's 35 
right to appeal the determination.  On a final determination of 36 
noncompliance, the employer shall repay all monies received as an economic 37 
development incentive to the government entity within thirty days of the 38 
final determination.  For the purposes of this subsection: 39 
1.  "Economic development incentive" means any grant, loan or 40 
performance-based incentive from any government entity that is awarded 41 
after September 30, 2008.  Economic development incentive does not include 42 
any tax provision under title 42 or 43. 43 
2.  "Government entity" means this state and any political 44 
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C.  Every three months the attorney general shall request from the 1 
United States department of homeland security a list of employers from 2 
this state that are registered with the e-verify program.  On receipt of 3 
the list of employers, the attorney general shall make the list available 4 
on the attorney general's website.  5 
Sec. 10.  Section 28-3511, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to 6 
read: 7 
28-3511.  Removal and immobilization or impoundment of vehicle 8 
A.  A peace officer shall cause the removal and either 9 
immobilization or impoundment of a vehicle if the peace officer determines 10 
that a person is driving the vehicle while any of the following applies: 11 
1.  The person's driving privilege is suspended or revoked for any 12 
reason. 13 
2.  The person has not ever been issued a valid driver license or 14 
permit by this state and the person does not produce evidence of ever 15 
having a valid driver license or permit issued by another 16 
jurisdiction.  This paragraph does not apply to the operation of an 17 
implement of husbandry. 18 
3.  The person is subject to an ignition interlock device 19 
requirement pursuant to chapter 4 of this title and the person is 20 
operating a vehicle without a functioning certified ignition interlock 21 
device.  This paragraph does not apply to a person operating an employer's 22 
vehicle or the operation of a vehicle due to a substantial emergency as 23 
defined in section 28-1464. 24 
4.  IN FURTHERANCE OF THE ILLEGAL PRESENCE OF AN ALIEN IN THE UNITED 25 
STATES AND IN VIOLATION OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE, THE PERSON IS TRANSPORTING 26 
OR MOVING OR ATTEMPTING TO TRANSPORT OR MOVE AN ALIEN IN THIS STATE IN A 27 
VEHICLE IF THE PERSON KNOWS OR RECKLESSLY DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT THE 28 
ALIEN HAS COME TO, HAS ENTERED OR REMAINS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 29 
VIOLATION OF LAW.  30 
5.  THE PERSON IS CONCEALING, HARBORING OR SHIELDING OR ATTEMPTING 31 
TO CONCEAL, HARBOR OR SHIELD FROM DETECTION AN ALIEN IN THIS STATE IN A 32 
VEHICLE IF THE PERSON KNOWS OR RECKLESSLY DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT THE 33 
ALIEN HAS COME TO, ENTERED OR REMAINS IN THE UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF 34 
LAW. 35 
B.  A peace officer shall cause the removal and impoundment of a 36 
vehicle if the peace officer determines that a person is driving the 37 
vehicle and if all of the following apply: 38 
1.  The person's driving privilege is canceled, suspended or revoked 39 
for any reason or the person has not ever been issued a driver license or 40 
permit by this state and the person does not produce evidence of ever 41 
having a driver license or permit issued by another jurisdiction. 42 
2.  The person is not in compliance with the financial 43 
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3.  The person is driving a vehicle that is involved in an accident 1 
that results in either property damage or injury to or death of another 2 
person. 3 
C.  Except as provided in subsection D of this section, while a 4 
peace officer has control of the vehicle the peace officer shall cause the 5 
removal and either immobilization or impoundment of the vehicle if the 6 
peace officer has probable cause to arrest the driver of the vehicle for a 7 
violation of section 4-244, paragraph 34 or section 28-1382 or 28-1383. 8 
D.  A peace officer shall not cause the removal and either the 9 
immobilization or impoundment of a vehicle pursuant to subsection C of 10 
this section if all of the following apply: 11 
1.  The peace officer determines that the vehicle is currently 12 
registered and that the driver or the vehicle is in compliance with the 13 
financial responsibility requirements of chapter 9, article 4 of this 14 
title. 15 
2.  The spouse of the driver is with the driver at the time of the 16 
arrest. 17 
3.  The peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the 18 
spouse of the driver: 19 
(a)  Has a valid driver license. 20 
(b)  Is not impaired by intoxicating liquor, any drug, a vapor 21 
releasing substance containing a toxic substance or any combination of 22 
liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances. 23 
(c)  Does not have any spirituous liquor in the spouse's body if the 24 
spouse is under twenty-one years of age. 25 
4.  The spouse notifies the peace officer that the spouse will drive 26 
the vehicle from the place of arrest to the driver's home or other place 27 
of safety. 28 
5.  The spouse drives the vehicle as prescribed by paragraph 4 of 29 
this subsection. 30 
E.  Except as otherwise provided in this article, a vehicle that is 31 
removed and either immobilized or impounded pursuant to subsection A, B or 32 
C of this section shall be immobilized or impounded for thirty days.  An 33 
insurance company does not have a duty to pay any benefits for charges or 34 
fees for immobilization or impoundment. 35 
F.  The owner of a vehicle that is removed and either immobilized or 36 
impounded pursuant to subsection A, B or C of this section, the spouse of 37 
the owner and each person identified on the department's record with an 38 
interest in the vehicle shall be provided with an opportunity for an 39 
immobilization or poststorage hearing pursuant to section 28-3514. 40 
Sec. 11.  Title 41, chapter 12, article 2, Arizona Revised Statutes, 41 
is amended by adding section 41-1724, to read: 42 
41-1724.  Gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement 43 
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THE GANG AND IMMIGRATION INTELLIGENCE TEAM ENFORCEMENT MISSION FUND 1 
IS ESTABLISHED CONSISTING OF MONIES DEPOSITED PURSUANT TO SECTION 11-1051 2 
AND MONIES APPROPRIATED BY THE LEGISLATURE.  THE DEPARTMENT SHALL 3 
ADMINISTER THE FUND.  MONIES IN THE FUND ARE SUBJECT TO LEGISLATIVE 4 
APPROPRIATION AND SHALL BE USED FOR GANG AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND 5 
FOR COUNTY JAIL REIMBURSEMENT COSTS RELATING TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION.  6 
Sec. 12.  Severability, implementation  and construction 7 
A.  If a provision of this act or its application to any person or 8 
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other 9 
provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect without the 10 
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this 11 
act are severable. 12 
B.  The terms of this act regarding immigration shall be construed 13 
to have the meanings given to them under federal immigration law. 14 
C.  This act shall be implemented in a manner consistent with 15 
federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all 16 
persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States 17 
citizens. 18 
D.  Nothing in this act shall implement or shall be construed or 19 
interpreted to implement or establish the REAL ID act of 2005 (P.L. 109-20 
13, division B; 119 Stat. 302) including the use of a radio frequency 21 
identification chip. 22 
Sec. 13.  Short title 23 
This act may be cited as the "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 24 
Neighborhoods Act". 25 
Sec. 14.  Immigration legislation challenges 26 
A.  Notwithstanding title 41, chapter 1, Arizona Revised Statutes, 27 
and any other law, through December 31, 2010, the attorney general shall 28 
act at the direction of the governor in any challenge in a state or 29 
federal court to Laws 2010, chapter 113 and any amendments to that law. 30 
B.  Notwithstanding title 41, chapter 1, Arizona Revised Statutes, 31 
and any other law, through December 31, 2010, the governor may direct 32 
counsel other than the attorney general to appear on behalf of this state 33 
to defend any challenge to Laws 2010, chapter 113 and any amendments to 34 
that law. 35 
 36 
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